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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In many ways, lawyers are different than other people.  In other 
ways, we are, sadly, so much the same.  What we often call “legal 
ethics” or “professional responsibility” is the law governing the practice 
of law.  This law serves to make us different, but our compliance with it 
struggles against the fact that we are not born different:  we struggle 
with the same demons as other mortals, and like them, we learn to 
rationalize our failings.  And, when we believe that no one is looking, 
when we are anonymous, we are more likely to rationalize. 
The structure of the large, modern law firm makes it easier for 
lawyers to be anonymous and to hide in the crowd where they are more 
likely to develop bad ethical habits.  Hence, large law firms in particular 
should support structural changes that serve to counterbalance and 
compensate our natural tendencies to justify our misbehavior when we 
believe that no one is looking.  There are few things that law firms can 
do, and case law applying the attorney-client privilege can support those 
structural changes.  But first, let us turn to the differences between 
lawyers and other professions.  These differences are not merely a 
difference in degree; they are a difference in kind. 
II.  THE ETHICS OF LAWYERS THAT MAKE US DIFFERENT 
If a lawyer wins a case that she should have lost, she is particularly 
happy.  After all, any lawyer can win a case if the facts and law are on 
her side; it takes a real lawyer to win a case on procedure.  Laypeople do 
not understand that. 
If someone hurls at you the charge of being “argumentative,” we 
know that is an insult.  But for lawyers, it is a compliment.  When 
lawyers were law students they told their friends, “Tomorrow, I will 
have an argument.  Would you like to come?”  “Thank you, yes,” we 
responded.  Afterward they asked their guests, “Did you enjoy the 
argument?”  Laypeople do not understand that. 
When law students return home during the Thanksgiving break of 
their first year, their grandmothers may ask them, “How many laws did 
you learn so far?”  “It does not work like that,” they respond.  Laypeople 
do not understand that. 
And, in law school we study ethics.  Laypeople do not understand 
that either. 
I recall a story of many years ago.  Two law students married each 
other just before starting their third year of law school.  After they had 
both graduated, they went to Scotland for a belated honeymoon at a 
2
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picturesque country inn.  The proprietress asked them how long they had 
been married.  “It’s been a year,” they said.  “What,” she responded, “A 
year, and no wee little ones yet?”  “Well,” they replied, “we had to finish 
school first.”  Her response:  “You mean in America you have to go to 
school for that too?”  So, in America we go to school to study 
ethics.When we study legal ethics, we find that many of the rules are not 
intuitive.  My first introduction to legal ethics was in eighth grade.  The 
teacher told each of us to write a paper on what we wanted to be.  I did 
not know any lawyers, but I knew I wanted to be one—although I did 
not know why.  So, I wrote the state bar and asked for information on 
being a lawyer.  The bar sent me its code of professional responsibility. 
One of the rules of professional responsibility stated that it was 
unethical to charge less than a certain amount of money per hour.1  I do 
not remember the exact amount, but I do remember that, whatever the 
hourly fee was, it was more than what my father earned in a good day. 
Think about that—it would be unethical for a lawyer to charge less 
for an hour of work than a skilled blue collar worker charged for a full 
day of work.  I did not understand the bar’s reasoning, because I was 
thinking like a buyer of legal services instead of like a seller.  Sellers 
always complain about “price wars,” but we know that a buyer has never 
been wounded in one.  Later, the Supreme Court—thinking like clients 
and not lawyers—held that minimum fee schedules violate the antitrust 
laws.2 
Until then, no truly ethical lawyer would dare undercut his 
competitors.  Consider what the New York State Bar Association 
solemnly warned in 1965:  “[L]et it be known, by whatever means, that a 
lawyer [who] will customarily charge for his services less than the 
recommended fees set forth in a duly adopted schedule is not in 
accordance with Canon 12 and is unethical as a form of solicitation and 
 
 1. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-16 (“The legal profession cannot remain 
a viable force in fulfilling its role in our society unless its members receive adequate compensation 
for services rendered, and reasonable fees should be charged in appropriate cases to clients able to 
pay them.”); EC 2-17 (“[A]dequate compensation is necessary in order to enable the lawyer to serve 
his client effectively and to preserve the integrity and independence of the profession.”); DR 2-101 
(Publicity in General); DR 2-102 (Professional Notices, Letterheads, Offices, and Law Lists) 
(amended as of Feb. 17, 1976), reprinted in, THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 250, 354–55 (1976). 
 2. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).  See Thomas D. Morgan, The Impact 
of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 415 (1998). 
3
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advertising.”3  This ethics opinion was hardly a judicial orphan.  It cited 
ABA Formal Ethics Opinions going back decades.4 
When the Wisconsin Bar published and distributed its new fee 
schedule to state judges and lawyers, the bar greeted it with virtual 
applause:  “The new schedule of minimum fees hit the Bar like a 
welcome rain on parched fields.”5  Within three years, it raised lawyers’ 
income by 25% to 50%.6  Price fixing has its advantages. 
Of course we all like to earn more, because “more” is generally 
better than “less.”  But other occupations do not claim that it is a sin to 
earn too little.  That leads to my second introduction to legal ethics.  The 
summer after my first year of law school, I worked in the law 
department of the First National Bank of Chicago.  My father said that it 
was good working for a bank—indoor work, no heavy lifting—but he 
warned that the salaries are not that high.  He was thinking of bank 
tellers.  I told him my salary and his mouth dropped:  I was earning 
substantially more than he was, and I was thirty years his junior. 
My third introduction to legal ethics grew out of my work at the 
bank.  It relates to the competitive advantage that the ethics rules give 
lawyers.  This competitive advantage serves to lift incomes.  Lawyers 
write the ethics rules so it should be no surprise that some rules help 
lawyers more than clients.7  When I was working for the First National 
Bank that summer, a legal ethics issue arose:  “unauthorized practice.”  
As most lawyers know, it is “unauthorized practice” and a crime for a 
person not admitted to the state bar to practice law.8  The bank’s 
 
 3. N.Y. State Bar Association, Professional Ethics Opinion, No. 6 (Jan. 29, 1965), 
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&CONTENTID=10532. 
 4. An Attorney’s Adherence to an Obligatory Fee Schedule Which is Applicable to Every 
Case of the Same Nature Would Result in a Violation of Canon 12 of the Canons of Ethics, 1930 
ABA FORMAL OP. 28; No Attorney Should Permit Himself to be Controlled By an Obligatory 
Minimum Fee Schedule Nor Should Any Bar Association Undertake to Impose Such Restrictions 
Upon Him, 1937 ABA FORMAL OP. 171; Although An Attorney Has a Right to Contract for Any Fee 
He Chooses So Long As It Is Not Clearly Excessive, Fees Should Ordinarily Be Arrived At By 
Consideration of the Factors Enumerated in Canon 12, 1939 ABA FORMAL OP. 190; The Habitual 
Charging of Fees Less Than Those Established by a Minimum Fee Schedule, or the Charging of 
Such Fees Without Proper Justification, May Be Evidence of Unethical Conduct, 1961 ABA 
FORMAL OP. 302. 
 5. STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN, A HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZED BAR IN WISCONSIN ch. 19 
(2011), available at http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=BarHistory& 
TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=48673. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See generally Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977). 
 8. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS:  THE LAWYER’S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY §§  5.5-3- 5.5-6 (8th ed. 2010). 
4
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unauthorized practice issue surfaced because of a typical problem for 
many couples at the time.  When the husband or wife died, the surviving 
spouse sometimes found that he or she could not get access to the joint 
bank account because of possible state estate taxes due.  The spouse 
simply filed a form with the state indicating that no taxes were owed 
because the estate was so small. 
The problem was that many bank customers were not educated 
enough to navigate the form.  The bank, as a courtesy, would send these 
people to lawyers in its trust department and they would help them fill 
out the form.  Some lawyers not working at the bank complained of the 
competition, arguing that the “bank” was engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law.9  And so the bank, which charged no money for this 
activity, stopped offering the free service rather than fight the charge.  
Many courts—in the name of legal ethics—protect the lawyer’s 
monopoly over legal services so that the “bank” cannot practice law.  
This prohibition applies even when the people who perform that actual 
work are really lawyers (not an incorporeal “bank”), there is no claim 
that the work is incompetent, and these lawyers are admitted to the bar.10 
Legal ethics thus told us first that it was unethical to charge too low 
a fee.  Second, it was also unethical for banks to compete with 
lawyers—even when the bank used lawyers duly admitted to the bar, 
who performed competently, and provided a free service to its 
customers, who were not complaining.  Third, given the restrictions on 
competition with lawyers, it should not be surprising that lawyers can 
make a lot of money.  An iron law of economics is that whatever gives a 
person competitive advantage also raises his or her income, and some 
ethics rules serve to give lawyers a competitive advantage. 
III.  LEGAL ETHICS REFORM IN CONTEMPORARY TIMES 
If you look at the ethics casebooks prior to the late 1970s, you will 
see that they include many cases about why lawyers should not compete 
by charging too little, or by advertising for business, or by helping non-
lawyers practice law.  That focus all changed after the Watergate 
scandal.  Indeed, there was no required law school course in legal ethics 
 
 9. See id. at § 5.5-7. 
 10. Indeed, lawyers engage in unauthorized practice even if they are admitted to the bar, but 
that bar is in a different state.  The well-known decision, Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank 
v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998), is but one example. 
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until the ABA began to require a course in legal ethics in response to our 
post-Watergate morality.11 
From a lawyer’s perspective, the most heartfelt moment during the 
televised Senate Watergate Committee hearings occurred when John 
Dean, the former Counsel to President Nixon, testified.  He had 
compiled a list of the people that he thought could be involved in a 
conspiracy to obstruct justice.  Next to many of the names was an 
asterisk.  One of the senators asked what those asterisks represented.  
They were the lawyers, John Dean said: 
John Dean:  I put a little asterisk beside each lawyer . . . . how in God’s 
name could so many lawyers get involved in something like this?12 
Yes, indeed:  how could so many lawyers be involved? 
An old witticism is that one should be careful for what one wishes 
because it may come true.  That saying applied to rules that mandated 
teaching the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct.  When law professors 
analyzed the legal rules, they often did not like what they saw.  A 
primary instrument of change in the law governing lawyers’ ethics has 
been lawsuits, supported by scholarly research and commentary.  The 
ethics rules have changed over the years, often because the courts have 
prodded, cajoled, and forced the organized bar to change. 
The Goldfarb13 decision banned minimum fee rules and Bates14 
held that blanket prohibitions on lawyer advertising violated free speech.  
Later, the American Law Institute continued its reform when it 
published the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers in 2000.15  
Actually, it is called the Restatement, Third, although there was no first 
or second.  Perhaps the ALI did that to confuse us, just like historians 
confuse us when we learn that there was a Napoleon III, but no 
Napoleon II. 
Ethics reform has not led to a golden age for lawyers.  Instead, it 
has witnessed calls for more reform, increased regulation, and high-
 
 11. Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics after Babel, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 989 (1990). 
 12. Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972, Senate Resolution 60:  Hearings Before the 
Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities of the United States Senate, 93rd Cong. 1054 
(1973).  This question is a common refrain.  E.g., Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. 
Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990): “Where were these professionals . . . when these clearly improper 
transactions were being consummated? . . . Where also were the . . . attorneys when these 
transactions were effectuated?”  See also Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A 
Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ Responsibility For Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993). 
 13. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 14. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000) (as adopted by the 
American Law Institute on May 12, 1998, but not published until 2000). 
6
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profile indictments of lawyers and those whom they have aided.  There 
has been a revolution of rising expectations for lawyers.  The legal 
business is changing rapidly and the future promises an increase in the 
rate of change.16 
IV.  THE PROBLEM OF ANONYMITY IN LARGE LAW FIRMS 
More and more lawyers are practicing in large law firms.  The bar 
authorities seldom mete out discipline to lawyers in these larger firm.17  
That might lead one to think that large law firms must be more ethical.  
But, as we shall see, the rarity of bar discipline is not because lawyers in 
large law firms never stoop to ethics violations.  Indeed, large firm 
lawyers are as human as the rest of us.  Instead, what is happening is that 
these large law firms find that malpractice law suits and government 
enforcement actions are on the increase, and both rely on the ethics 
rules.  That is where the action is.  It is the malpractice suits based on 
ethical violations18 and the disqualification motions based on the ethics 
rules19 that have come to represent much greater danger to large law 
firms than bar discipline.20  Recently, for example, a jury awarded $103 
million against a major law firm based on a conflict of interest charge.21  
And there are the criminal cases:  legal discipline (if it ever occurs) 
comes after the criminal prosecution for fraud.22 
 
 16. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER (2010) discusses many of the 
changes likely to occur. 
 17. Lisa G. Lerman, A Double Standard for Lawyer Dishonesty:  Billing Fraud Versus 
Misappropriation, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 848 (2006). 
 18. E.g., Baldasarre v. Butler, 604 A.2d 112 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (upholding a 
$1.9 million judgment against a lawyer and his law firm because they attempted to represent both 
the seller and the buyer of real estate). 
 19. E.g., Laucella v. Ireland San Filippo, No. H028700, 2006 WL 75355 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. 
Jan. 13, 2006).  Note that this case is not reported in Cal.Rptr.3d.  California Rules of Court, Rule 
8.1115, restricts citation of unpublished opinions in California courts.  The court upheld the trial 
court’s decision to disqualify the plaintiffs’ counsel based on a conflict of interest.  Id. at *11. 
 20. Courts are also enjoining a lawyer involved in a conflict if there is no proceeding in which 
a court could disqualify the lawyer.  See, e.g., Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Tang, 674 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 
1996). 
 21. Julie Wernau, $103 Million Verdict Against Baker & McKenzie, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 
26, 2010, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-1026-baker-mckenzie--
20101026,0,5276111.story (“The case centers on Joel Held, a Baker & McKenzie attorney based in 
Dallas, who represented both sides of an oil-rig-drilling business that turned sour for one client 
while benefiting the other, according to court documents.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Jay Weaver, Ponzi Schemer Scott Rothstein Gets 50-Year Sentence, MIAMI 
HERALD, Jun. 9, 2010, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/06/09/1671305/ponzi-
schemer-scott-rothstein.html.  
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The structure of the modern large law firm can be a breeding 
ground for ethics violations.  It is not unusual for these mega-firms to be 
composed of hundreds of lawyers or over a thousand lawyers, stretching 
over many cities and two or more continents.  By the end of the 1950s, 
only thirty-eight law firms in the entire country had more than fifty 
lawyers each.23  As late as 1968, only twenty law firms numbered more 
than 100 lawyers.24  Twenty years later, in 1988, 149 firms had more 
lawyers than the largest law firm in 1968.25  The largest law firm of 1988 
numbered nearly 1000 lawyers.26  “By 2006, Baker & McKenzie had 
more than 3500 lawyers, DLA Piper had over 3300 lawyers,” and twenty 
other law firms had more than 1000 lawyers.27  In 2008, thirteen law 
firms had gross revenues of over $1 billion and another fifty-eight had 
revenues of more than $500 million.28 
A difference in degree, when great enough, is also a difference in 
kind.  A law firm of 500 lawyers is not simply ten times larger than a 
firm of fifty lawyers:  it is qualitatively different because the large law 
structure gives a sense of anonymity to the lawyers in the firm.  Few will 
know the names of all their colleagues, even in the city where the firm is 
located; even fewer will know the names of their partners in other cities; 
and fewer still will know the names of the associates, some of whom 
come and go with each passing month.  Anonymity fosters an 
environment of shadows where bad ethics, like toadstools, thrive. 
This anonymity creates a problem for law firms.  Several decades 
ago, when law firms were much smaller, a partner might be a little 
reluctant to do something that was ethically dubious (e.g., padding his 
legal bills) because of a fear that if his client complained and his partners 
discovered what he had done, they would forever look down upon him 
because of what he had done.  The moral calculus changes when you do 
not even know the names of your partners or what they look like.  There 
is less fear of shame, particularly when your rank and salary within the 
law firm depends on billing hours and keeping your clients happy. 
As law firms have grown exponentially, and as partners’ salaries 
have reached the high six figures, the ethical failings have kept pace.  As 
a response to the Enron bankruptcy and the involvement of the legal and 
 
 23. Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger:  The Promotion-To-
Partner Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747, 749 (1990). 
 24. MORGAN, supra note 16, at 99-100. 
 25. Galanter & Palay, supra note 23, at 749. 
 26. Id. The largest law firm had 962 lawyers. 
 27. MORGAN, supra note 16, at 101 
 28. Id. 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/3
8-ROTUNDA_44.3 PROOF-DONE.DOC 8/15/2011  1:58 PM 
2011] WHY LAWYERS ARE DIFFERENT AND WHY WE ARE THE SAME 687 
accounting professions, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.29  
Among other things, Sarbanes-Oxley imposed new duties on lawyers,30 
some of whom were caught up in the scandals.31  Since the enactment of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the federal government has filed quite a number of 
charges against lawyers who allegedly knew about or participated in 
corporate fraud.  In this post-Enron world, fraud, sometimes garden 
variety fraud, continues.  In recent years, the federal government has 
indicted an “astonishing number of lawyers” in corporate fraud cases.32 
Consider a few recent examples.  In 2008, a former partner from 
the prestigious New York law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, resigned from 
the New York bar after the firm learned that he billed his clients and 
firm more than $500,000 in travel and entertainment expenses that were 
personal, inflated, or fictitious.33  That same year, a former partner in the 
New York office of Latham & Watkins (another prestigious law firm) 
pled guilty to defrauding his clients and his own law firm of more than 
 
 29. In particular, see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §307, 15 U.S.C. §7245 (2006), where 
Congress required the SEC to: 
[I]ssue rules, in the public interest . . . setting forth minimum standards of professional 
conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the 
representation of issuers , including a rule (1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of 
a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by 
the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer 
of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and (2) if the counsel or officer does not 
appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial 
measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the 
evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another 
committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly 
or indirectly by the issuer , or to the board of directors. 
Id. 
 30. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 8, at §§ 1.6-12(b), 1.6-12 (e)(4), 1.13-1(c), & 
1.13-2(c). 
 31. See In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F.Supp.2d 549, 610 
(S.D.Tex. 2002) (“[P]rofessionals, including lawyers and accountants, when they take the 
affirmative step of speaking out, whether individually or as essentially an author or co-author in a 
statement or report, whether identified or not, about their client’s financial condition, do have a duty 
to third parties not in privity not to knowingly or with severe recklessness issue materially 
misleading statements on which they intend or have reason to expect that those third parties will 
rely.”); see also Benjamin Weiser, Lawyer Gets 20 Years in $700 Million Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 
14, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/nyregion/14dreier.html (“Marc S. 
Dreier, once a high-flying New York lawyer who orchestrated an elaborate fraud scheme that bilked 
hedge funds and other investors of $700 million, was sentenced on Monday to 20 years in prison by 
a judge who rejected the government’s request for a much longer sentence.”). 
 32. Richard M. Strassberg, David B. Pitofsky & Samantha L. Schreiber, Lawyers on Trial: 
Government Views Attorneys As  ‘First Line Of Defense’ Against Corporate Malfeasance, 234 N.Y. 
L. J. 9, col. 1 (2005). 
 33. In re Spinelli-Noseda, 863 N.Y.S.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (per curiam). 
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$300,000 in false expenses.34  In 2006, an intellectual property lawyer at 
yet another blue chip law firm resigned from the law firm and from the 
bar, in disgrace, after he admitted to “making affirmative 
misrepresentations to the firm in connection with his request for and 
receipt of reimbursement for various expenses, submitting false and 
fictitious letters and billings in connection with certain so-called pro 
bono clients, forging clients’ names on firm correspondence and making 
other misrepresentations to clients and lawyers.”35  The bar suspended a 
former tax partner at Willkie Farr & Gallagher for one year.  It turns out 
that over a course of two years, he billed clients for $30,000 worth of 
personal long-distance calls.36  And, let us not forget Webster Hubbell, 
who was President Clinton’s Associate Attorney General.  He resigned 
under pressure in 1994 when his former law firm discovered billing 
fraud.  He went to prison for sixteen months after he pled guilty to 
fraudulently charging almost $500,000 for personal expenses and billing 
for legal work he never performed.37 
In 2004, Stephen Woghin, the former general counsel of Computer 
Associates, pled guilty to obstruction of justice in connection with 
coaching company employees to provide false testimony to 
investigators.38  Two years earlier, the SEC charged that Franklin C. 
 
 34. Anthony Lin, Former Latham Partner Pleads Guilty to Defrauding Clients, Firm, N.Y. L. 
J., Mar. 31, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005561071. 
 35. In re DiSalvatore, 33 A.D.3d 195, 196 (App. Div., 1st Dept. 2006) (per curiam). 
 36. In re Carmody, 32 A.D.3d 173 (App. Div., 1st Dept. 2006) (per curiam).  The lawyer 
“admitted that he misrepresented that the calls were related to work performed on behalf of clients, 
but he did not concede that his misconduct was deceitful.”  Id. at 174.  He blamed his conduct on 
stress resulting from his marriage breakup.  Id. 
 37. Harry J. Maue, 1994:  A Bad Year for Legal Ethics, 5 CORP. LEGAL TIMES 1 (1995), 1995 
WLNR 5663944 (the allegations involved “over $1 million in expenses and unbilled time charges”); 
Darlene Ricker, Greed, Ignorance and Overbilling: Some Lawyers Have Given New Meaning to the 
Term “Legal Fiction.”  Now the Profession is Asking Why, How Widespread and How Do We Stop 
It? 80 A.B.A. J. 62 (1994); Lin, supra note 34. 
 38. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FORMER COMPUTER ASSOCIATES EXECUTIVES INDICTED ON 
SECURITIES FRAUD, OBSTRUCTION CHARGES, Sept. 24, 2004 http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/ 
pr/2004/September/04_crm_642.htm (“CA [Computer Associates] retained a law firm to represent it 
in connection with the government investigations.  Shortly after being retained, the company’s law 
firm met with Kumar, Richards, Woghin and other CA executives in order to inquire into their 
knowledge of the practices that were the subject of the government investigations.  During these 
meetings, the defendants and others allegedly failed to disclose, falsely denied and concealed the 
existence of the 35-day month practice.  [The indictment explained that the goal of the ‘35-day 
month’ was to permit CA to report that it met or exceeded its projected quarterly revenue and 
earnings when, in fact, it had not.]  Kumar, Richards, Woghin and others allegedly presented to the 
law firm an assortment of false justifications to explain away evidence of the 35-day month 
practice.  The indictment alleges that Kumar, Richards and Woghin knew, and in fact intended, that 
the company’s law firm would present these false justifications to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the 
SEC and the FBI in an attempt to persuade the government that the 35-day month practice never 
10
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Brown, the former vice chairman and chief legal officer of Rite Aid 
Corp., and others,  “were responsible for one of the most egregious 
accounting frauds in recent history.”39  In 2004, the jury convicted Mr. 
Brown of ten felony counts of lying to federal regulators.  The judge 
sentenced the seventy-six-year-old lawyer and his new pacemaker to ten 
years in prison.40 
Compare that punishment with what the court meted out to Michael 
Milken, the junk-bond king of the 1980s whom the Government 
prosecuted after the 1987 stock market crash.  Milken was no lawyer, 
but he was as sophisticated as anyone when it came to the securities 
laws.  In 1989, Rudy Giuliani, then U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, prosecuted Milken for ninety-eight counts of 
racketeering and fraud.  Milken pled guilty to six counts of various 
securities and reporting violations.  Judge Kimba Wood recommended a 
ten-year prison sentence, and said that Milken should serve at least 
thirty-six to forty months.  In fact, he served only about twenty-two 
months and remained a wealthy man, with a net worth of at least $700 
million, even after paying $900 million in fines and settlements 
(including civil law suits).41 Milken should be thankful that the harsher 
penalties have only come in recent years. 
Not only have punishments increased, but the number of 
prosecutions has grown as well.  During the first eight months of 2005, 
the SEC barred or suspended at least eighteen lawyers from practicing 
 
existed.  The indictment further alleges that Kumar frequently instructed Woghin to meet with CA 
employees prior to their being interviewed by the government or the company’s lawyers to coach 
them on how to answer questions without disclosing the 35-day month practice.”) (emphasis added).  
The problem of false witness-coaching is described in Lester Brickman & Ronald D. Rotunda, 
When Witnesses Are Told What to Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1998, at A15, col. 2-4. 
 39. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC LITIGATION RELEASE NO. 17577 / JUNE 
21, 2002, ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT RELEASE NO. 1581 / JUNE 21, 2002, 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Frank M. Bergonzi, Martin L. Grass, And Franklin C. 
Brown, 1:CV02-1084 (M.D. Pa.), http://ftp.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17577.htm. 
 40. Joseph Savage & Christine Sgarlata Chung, Trends in Corporate Fraud Enforcement:  A 
Calm During the Storm?, 13 LAW J. NEWSLETTERS, BUSINESS CRIMES BULLETIN 1, 2 (2005), 
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/~/media/Files/Publications/Attorney%20Articles/2005/Trends_in_
Corporate_Fraud_Enforcement.pdf. 
 41. E.g., Reviewed by Daniel J. Kornstein,  Lawyer:  A Life of Counsel and Controversy, 220 
N.Y. L. J. 2 (1998); Editorial, Junk Sentence for Milken, NAT’L REV., Dec. 17, 1990; Milken 
Released To Halfway House, 139 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 1 (Jan.4, 1993); Today’s News:  Update, 205 
N.Y. L. J. 1 (March 5, 1991); Jayne O’Donnell & Richard Willing, Prison Time Gets Harder For 
White-Collar Crooks, USA TODAY, May 11, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/ 
money/companies/management/2003-05-11-bighouse_x.htm; JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 
(1991); Emily Lambert & Monte Burke, Dishonor Roll, FORBES, Mar. 29, 2004, at 46. 
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before it.42  By comparison, it disbarred or suspended only three lawyers 
in all 2004, five in 2003, and only one each in 2002 and 2001.43 
In addition to criminal and SEC enforcement, there is the risk of 
tort liability and disqualification.  One does not need an economics 
degree to conclude that lawyers pay more attention to legal ethics when 
the results affect their pocket books.  One accomplished lawyer told me 
that, about twenty years ago when he began working for a well-known 
malpractice insurer, the head lawyer told him to first read the ABA 
Model Rules cover-to-cover.  He was surprised: What does this have to 
do with insuring law firms?  After a short time on the job, he learned that 
a major risk with blue chip law firms is not that they are likely to miss a 
statute of limitations.  Rather, it is that large law firms will be involved 
in a conflict of interest or violation of another ethics rule that leads to 
tort liability.44 
There is a long list of blue chip law firms for which bar discipline 
may be the least of their worries.  Instead, the problem is malpractice 
liability based on the violation of the ethics rules.  Baltimore’s Venable, 
Baetjer & Howard settled a lawsuit for $27 million involving conflicts of 
interests.45  New York’s Milberg Weiss settled a malicious prosecution 
case for $50 million.  After losing a jury verdict for $45 million for this 
malicious prosecution, it settled by wiring a check for $50 million before 
the jury could deliberate on punitive damages.46  A few years later, a Los 
Angeles federal grand jury indicted this law firm for obstructing justice, 
perjury, bribery, and fraud.47  In re Futuronics Corp.48 denied a law firm 
 
 42. Savage and Sgarlata Chung,  supra note 40, at 1, 2 
 43. Id. 
 44. E.g., Wernau, supra note 21 (“According to the complaint, the defendants drafted legal 
documents that established subsidiaries of the joint company in Evans’ name and controlled by 
Cagle, without advising Evans that they had been created.  The subsidiaries and Evans’ assets were 
then used to obtain other loans, which would show up in the bank account of their company, then 
immediately be withdrawn for Cagle’s other uses.”). 
 45. Kirk Victor, Venable Agrees to $27M Accord, 9 NAT’L L. J. 37, May 25, 1987, at 3.  A 
precursor of some of these conflicts problems may be found in Ronald D. Rotunda, Law, Lawyers 
and Managers, in THE ETHICS OF CORPORATE CONDUCT 127-45 (1977). 
 46. Richard B. Schmitt, Milberg Weiss Agrees to Pay $50 Million to Settle Lexecon Case, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1999, at B17; Karen Donovan, Milberg Weiss’ $50M Mistake:  The Inside 
Story of Why Jurors Didn’t Buy the Firm’s Testimony, NAT’L L. J., Apr. 26, 1999, at A1. 
 47. Julie Creswell, Milberg Weiss Is Charged With Bribery and Fraud, N. Y. TIMES, May 18, 
2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/18/us/18cnd-legal.html?ex=1305604800& 
en=b01b688a560ca3d5&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 
 48. 655 F.2d 463, 468-71 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982).  See also Halbert 
v. Yousif, 225 B.R. 336, 343 (E.D. Mich. 1998).  
Upon review of the record, this Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court correctly 
determined that Halbert violated several other fiduciary obligations that had been 
imposed upon him by bankruptcy law.  Based on these acts of misconduct, the 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/3
8-ROTUNDA_44.3 PROOF-DONE.DOC 8/15/2011  1:58 PM 
2011] WHY LAWYERS ARE DIFFERENT AND WHY WE ARE THE SAME 691 
over one million dollars in fees under the Bankruptcy Code because of a 
prohibited fee-splitting arrangement and its failure to comply with 
disclosure provisions for joint representation.  This list will never be 
complete. 
In the last few years we have witnessed what some are calling “the 
Great Recession,” accompanied by evidence of rampant corruption.  
There is Bernard Madoff who created a Ponzi scheme of $50 billion or 
more!49  Madoff did not invent dishonesty, but he surely perfected it.  
Normally, birds do not like to dirty their own nest, but that rule did not 
apply to Madoff, who lulled even his friends to invest in his scheme.  He 
pretended to earn above-average returns with below-average volatility.  
What he really did was take the money for himself, while telling his 
investors they were doing very well.  If an investor wanted to withdraw 
funds, Madoff gave them money he took from other investors.  He did 
not earn any actual profit, but he lived like a king, until too many 
investors wanted their money back.50 
Recently, the former partner of a major law firm pled guilty to 
charges of conspiracy and tax evasion, earning up to ten years in prison.  
Prosecutors alleged defendants used tax shelters to generate over $7 
billion in fraudulent tax losses for at least 931 wealthy individuals.  In 
2005, two years before this partner’s law firm went out of business, “the 
firm agreed to pay $81.6 million to clients who sued over bad tax-shelter 
advice.”51 
The subprime mortgage mess has brought us a world-wide 
recession accompanied by executives who lavishly spent other people’s 
money.  Financial analysts initially hailed John Thain as a hero for 
 
Bankruptcy Court assessed the totality of Halbert’s violations and concluded that  “[t]he 
only proper response” to those deficiencies was to deny his fee applications. 
Id.  The court then concluded that: 
[The] decision to deny attorney all fees for service that he provided in Chapter 11 case of 
debtor-corporation was not an abuse of discretion; but . . . attorney’s disinterestedness 
and disclosure violations in a Chapter 11 case of debtor-corporation did not permit any 
denial of compensation for services that the attorney  performed in a separate Chapter 11 
cases of corporate principals. 
Id. at 336. 
 49. Stephen Gandel, Wall Street’s Latest Downfall: Madoff Charged with Fraud, TIME, Dec. 
12, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1866154,00.html.  See 
also, John Pacenti, Madoff, $17M in Losses Claimed: Miami Lawsuits Say Bank Funneled Money 
into Ponzi, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV. A1, 2010 WLNR 24768189 (12/15/10) (“Madoff's $65 billion 
Ponzi scheme”). 
 50. Ronald D. Rotunda, Was Madoff Good for the Economy?, CHI. TRIB., April 3, 2009, at 49. 
 51. Ashby Jones, Former Jenkens Partner Pleads Guilty To Conspiracy, Tax Evasion, WSJ 
BLOGS, LAW BLOG (Oct. 19, 2010, 5:18 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/10/19/former-jenkens-
partner-pleads-guilty-to-conspiracy-tax-evasion/?KEYWORDS=law+blog. 
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selling Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. to Bank of America to save the 
brokerage firm from imminent failure.  Bank of America kept him to run 
the company’s securities arm.52  Soon after that acquisition, the Merrill 
Lynch deal looked like a big mistake.  Bank of America ousted Thain.  
Bank of America was concerned that Merrill’s losses were far worse 
than expected, and that Thain had not fully disclosed all the red ink 
while Merrill was paying out bonuses.53  While his company was 
hemorrhaging money, and shares were tumbling in value, Thain was 
spending $1.2 million in corporate funds to renovate his office, buying 
such essentials as a $1,400 wastepaper basket made of parchment and a 
pair of guest chairs costing nearly $90,000.54  After the market learned 
about Thain’s ouster, shares of Bank of America jumped nearly 10%.55  
Think about that: Thain appears to have added nearly 10% to the value 
of this multi-million-dollar company by the simple act of leaving! 
V.  ANONYMITY AND ETHICS VIOLATIONS:  WHY WE ARE THE SAME  
The Great Recession’s recent round of scandals illustrates several 
points.  Unlike the financial scandals of the prior decades,56 lawyers 
were not at the forefront, and for that we can be grateful.  Still, we are 
 
 52. Hoovers Company In-Depth Records, 2011 WLNR 5699783 (3/24/11). 
 53. Heather Landy, Former Merrill Chief Is Out at Bank of America, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 
2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/22/ 
AR2009012203628.html. 
 54. Thain’s Office Overhaul Said to Cost $1.2 Million, N.Y. TIMES DEAL BOOK (Jan. 22, 
2009, 1:21 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/thains-office-overhaul-said-to-cost-
12-million/. 
 55. On January 22, after the market closed, is when Thain resigned.  January 23, 2009, Bank 
of America stock closed at $6.24; on January 22, it closed at $5.71, or a difference of $0.53. The 
stock increased nearly 9.28% right after Thain announced his ouster.  BANK OF AMERICA 
HISTORICAL PRICE LOOKUP, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-
stocklookup&t=HistQuote (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).  Landy, supra note 53.  John Thain became 
CEO of Merrill Lynch on December 1, 2007.  Id.  In September 2008, Bank of America acquired 
Merrill Lynch.  Id.  See also Matthew Karnitschnig, Carrick Mollenkamp & Dan Fitzpatrick, Bank 
of America to Buy Merrill, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB122142278543033525.html?mod=special_coverage&mg=com-wsj.  A few months later, on 
January 22, 2009, Thain resigned after disclosure that he had paid out $4 billion in fourth quarter 
bonuses to Merrill employees, just before Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch.  Erik Larson, 
Cuomo Said to Eye Return of $4 Billion in Early Merrill Bonuses, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 29, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aiCmAzh98Z70. 
 56. See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987); Rubin v. Schottenstein, 
Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Vanguard Production, Inc. v. Martin, 894 
F.2d 375 (10th Cir. 1990) (title opinion used in selling oil and gas leases); Vereins–Und Westbank, 
AG v. Carter, 691 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (lawyer’s letter to support issuance of surety 
bond); Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Mehaffy, 
Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Central Bank Denver, N.A., 892 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1995) (en banc). 
14
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not as different as we would like, for corrupt lawyers were well-
represented in any lineup of the cast of characters of the present-day 
scandals.  Granted, no lawyer created a multi-billion dollar Ponzi 
scheme like Madoff, but former Florida lawyer Scott W. Rothstein (now 
serving fifty years in prison) was no piker:  he was the architect of a $1.2 
billion Ponzi scheme.57 
Sarbanes-Oxley did not stop the financial carnage, as we relearned 
that ancient truth:  generals and politicians always seem to fight the last 
war.  And we learned that while investment bankers and CEO’s do not 
live under a code of ethics, we lawyers—who do live under such a 
code—had little problem in joining the corruption frenzy. 
Finally, we learned that people of outstanding reputation continue to 
surprise us with their willingness to embrace corruption.  Lawyers are no 
different in degree or kind from non-lawyers.  Madoff was not a lawyer, 
but there are plenty of examples of lawyers who have breached their 
fiduciary obligations even if Madoff’s avarice dwarfed theirs.  Rothstein, 
for example, was considered an upright citizen:  he gave millions to 
charity and created a firm that employed seventy lawyers,58 many of 
whom had sterling reputations.  Rothstein’s firm included Ken Padowitz, 
a former prosecutor and national legal commentator; Carlos Reyes, a 
former South Broward Hospital district commissioner; Steve Abrams, a 
former mayor of Boca Raton; and William Berger, a former Palm Beach 
circuit judge.59  Rothstein benefitted from their reputations and used 
those reputations for his own nefarious purposes.60  As Professor David 
Luban has astutely remarked: 
Most of us are inclined to think that the big problem in the ethics 
scandals is lack of integrity on the part of the principals.  But if 
integrity means doing what you think is right, these men and women 
had integrity to burn.  They got it the cheap way:  once they did things, 
they believed those things were right.61 
 
 57. Jacqueline Bell, Rothstein Ordered To Pay $363M In Restitution, LAW 360:  THE 
NEWSWIRE FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS, Aug. 30, 2010, http://www.law360.com/articles/190297. 
 58. Weaver, supra note 22; Buddy Nevins, Rothstein’s Story:  Jewish Kid from The Bronx 
Makes Waves, BROWARDBEAT.COM (Oct. 22, 2008), http://www.browardbeat.com/rothsteins-story-
jewish-kid-from-the-bronx-makes-waves/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). 
 59. Nevins, supra note 58. 
 60. Rothstein used his law firm to “prop himself up as a flashy player among wealthy 
investors, society types, trendy entrepreneurs and prominent politicians—including Gov. Charlie 
Crist.”  Weaver, supra note 22. 
 61. See David Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, in ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF 
SOCIAL JUSTICE:  A CRITICAL READER 355, 365-66 (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005).  Professor Luban is 
the Frederick Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy at Georgetown University Law Center.  Id. at 
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VI.  THE DANGERS OF ANONYMITY 
Why do lawyers like Rothstein reject their legal training?  There is 
no simple answer to this question.  Professor Luban advises that we 
rationalize our corruption and conclude that what we do is not wrong.62  
That is certainly true.  Our legal ethics are a thinner veneer than we 
would like. 
Another problem is anonymity.  When we think no one is looking, 
when we are anonymous, we are more willing to do things that we 
would not do if we were alone and unobserved.63    Justice Brandeis is 
famous for his view on privacy:  the right to be left alone.64  But he also 
spoke of the advantages of publicity when he advised, “Sunlight is said 
to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman.”65 
We can be anonymous by working in the dead of night.  But, we 
also may be anonymous while lost in a crowd.  In the modern large law 
firm, many lawyers are atomized.  When we are truly alone, or when we 
are anonymous because we are part of a large group, we are more likely 
to act differently than if a street lamp were shining on us and others were 
looking.  Whether we are truly alone or part of a large enough group of 
people (and therefore anonymous in a crowd),66 we are more likely to 
fall short of our ethical duties. 
We know that people often do things as part of a mob that they 
would never do if they were part of a small group.  Lynch mobs depend 
on this fact.  If the mob breaks up into smaller groups, the blood lust 
dissipates along with the anonymity that the mob offers.  The lynch mob 
 
355 n.1.  As a nonlawyer, he often brings a refreshing, creative, and thoughtful perspective to legal 
problems. 
 62. Id. at 365-66. 
 63. Economic studies bear out this common sense intuition.  E.g., Todd L. Cherry, Peter 
Fryblom, & Jason F. Schgren, Harnose the Dictator, 92 AM. ECONOMIC REV. 1218 (No. 4, 2002); 
Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, & Vernon Smith, Social Distance and Other-Regarding 
Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECONOMIC REV. 653 (1996); Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin 
McCabe, Keith Shachat, & Vernon Smith, Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in 
Bargaining Games, 7 GAMES & ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 346 (1994). 
 64. “They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”, Olmstead v. United States,  
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 65. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY—AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT, ch. V 
(1914), available at http://www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/196. 
 66. DAVID RIESMAN WITH NATHAN GLAZER & REUEL DENNEY, THE LONELY CROWD:  A 
STUDY OF THE CHANGING AMERICAN CHARACTER (1950).  Anchor Books-Doubleday published a 
revised and shortened version in 1953.  It became a best seller.  Riesman was trained as a lawyer, 
and was an editor of the Harvard Law Review when he was a law school student. 
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offers “the loss of responsibility through anonymity.”67  That anonymity 
makes each individual member less inhibited, just as the large size of the 
mob helps each member to rationalize that he is doing something right, 
not something wrong.68  Only an individual with strong convictions can 
dissuade a mob from carrying out its acts.  These are the real heroes; 
most of us (if we do not join the mob) leave quietly, convincing 
ourselves that nothing can be done and there is no need to get involved. 
We do not need a lynch mob to acquire anonymity and lose 
inhibitions.  Any situation that affords anonymity allows us to act 
inconsistently with the way we would normally act.  In a sense, we 
become part of a virtual lynch mob—a rather genteel lynch mob, to be 
sure, because we do not shout and rant.  But we do act differently.   
“A foolish consistency,” Emerson said, “is the hobgoblin of little 
minds . . . .”69  Emerson was only speaking of foolish consistencies, but 
it is easy to slide over that distinction when we rationalize our 
indiscretions and conclude that what we did or did not do is really 
justified and acceptable.  “Everyone does it,” we assure ourselves.  The 
road of least resistance is to follow the herd. 
The herd mentality accompanies bull markets that mark the end of 
bubbles and the beginning of major declines.  We tend to do what others 
do, but only those who do not follow the herd are the ones to make the 
real money.  We all know that we should buy low and sell high, but it is 
much easier to buy when everyone else is buying enthusiastically and 
much harder to buy when doom and gloom abound.70  When the “smart 
money” buys, we buy.71  When people panic and sell, we sell.  It is 
easier to buy high, when optimism abounds, and sell low, when 
pessimism is the order of the day, than to do the opposite.  But most of 
us follow the herd. 
 
 67. 3 THE CORSINI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 1009 (Irving B. Weiner & W. Edward 
Craighead eds., 4th ed. 2010). 
 68. PSYCHOLOGY FOR THE ARMED SERVICES 447 (Edwin G. Boring ed., 1945).  Mob action 
in the military is called mutiny. Id. at 455.  While it happens, it is rare because of the effort to 
discipline the troops.  Id. 
 69. “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and 
philosophers and divines.”  Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS 57 (First Series, 1865). 
 70. Economic empirical studies also bear out this fact that we tend to create bubbles in the 
stock market when we thing we are smarter than others, for then we follow the “greater fool” 
theory—we just follow others rather than adding to the wisdom of the group.  Vernon L. Smith, 
Gerry L. Suchanek, & Arlington W. Williams, Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in 
Experimental Spot Asset Markets, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1119 (1988).  See also, JAMES SUROWIECKI, 
THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 249-51 (2004) (discussing experiments). 
 71. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 158 (2d ed. 2005). 
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The herd mentality applies not just to the stock market.  It applies 
to all of life.  Consider the case of Kitty (Catherine) Genovese.  Few 
people are old enough to remember, but it was national news a half-
century ago.  She was a twenty-eight-year old New York City woman 
stabbed to death near her home in the Kew Gardens section of Queens, 
New York, in 1964.72  At the time, newspapers reported that over three 
dozen people saw or heard her crying for help after she was stabbed.73  It 
took her about a half-hour to die.  The newspapers reported that others 
heard or observed portions of the attack but they closed their windows.  
They did not want to get involved.  No one called the police until the 
final assault, each of them perhaps thinking that someone else would do 
it.  Eventually someone did, but by then it was too late. 
Sadly, the news reports are filled with ordinary humans acting in a 
most inhumane manner as apathetic bystanders.  Search for “people 
ignore man dying on street” on Google and you will get thousands of 
hits.  Last year in Detroit, a group of people were playing hockey on the 
frozen waters in the basement of an abandoned building.  They found a 
dead, frozen body.  They did not call the police, but they continued 
playing their hockey game.  A reporter asked a homeless man living in 
the building if he had called the police.  “No,” he said, “I figured 
someone else did.”74  They followed the herd and did nothing. 
In London, England, passers-by ignored the pleas for help of an 
eighty-one-year-old widow who had been mugged.  She lay on the 
pavement pleading for help for ten minutes.  Two women, who initially 
crossed to the other side of the street to avoid her, heard her cries, came 
to her aid, and called for help, but it was too late.  She died in the 
hospital.75 
 
 72. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RAPE 91 (Merril D. Smith ed., 2004).  E.g., A.M. ROSENTHAL, 
THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES:  THE KITTY GENOVESE CASE (1999). 
 73. Later reports cast doubt on the complete accuracy of the New York Times story about the 
incident.  This story was based on the initial police report.  Queens Woman Is Stabbed to Death in 
Front of Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1964, at 26.  See also Thirty-Eight Who Saw Murder Didn’t 
Call the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1964.  The number of witnesses who heard the screams may 
be been closer to a dozen, and the number who actually saw something may be a half-dozen.  Jim 
Rasenberger, Nightmare on Austin Street, 57 AM. HERITAGE (Oct. 2006), available at 
http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/2006/5/2006_5_65.shtml.  Still, a half-
dozen did not respond. 
 74. Charlie LeDuff, Frozen in Indifference:  Life Goes on around Body Found in Vacant 
Warehouse, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20090128/METRO08/901280491. 
 75. The police reported that passers-by may have thought she was drunk.  Charlotte Gill & 
Sophie Borland, Woman, 81, Killed in Street Mugging “Ignored by Passers-By as She Called for 
Help,” DAILY MAIL, Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1121642/Woman-81-
killed-street-mugging-ignored-passers-called-help.html; Passersby Ignore Woman, 81, Dying on 
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A month later in Washington, D.C., two assailants attacked a man 
who hit his head on a nearby car and fell to the ground.  He lied there 
unconscious on a busy street for nineteen minutes while passersby and 
grocery store customers went about their business.  When a grocery store 
employee finally called 9-1-1, the ambulance arrived within two 
minutes.  But it was too late:  the man died.76 
In April of 2010, a homeless man saved a woman from a knife-
wielding attacker.  The attacker then turned to this homeless hero and 
stabbed him.  For one hour and twenty minutes, the man lay dying in a 
pool of his own blood.  Video surveillance showed that sophisticated 
New Yorkers walked past without calling for help.  One man stopped to 
take a cell phone photograph of the victim before leaving.  Eventually, 
someone called 9-1-1, and firefighters came fifteen minutes later.  By 
then, he was dead.77  A few months ago, a man died on a highway ramp, 
just minutes from a hospital, while car after car drove past without 
stopping or calling for help.  The video confirmed what the police 
reported: a body lay on the road, but “the number of cars that just drive 
by [is] incredible.  No one stops. . . . No one’s calling, no one’s 
stopping.  Cars just brake and move out of the way.”78 
How is it that humans act so inhumanely?79  We did not evolve that 
way.  Our DNA does not compel us to turn our gaze and move on, only 
 
Street After Attack, FOX NEWS, Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,480663,00.html. 
 76. People Ignore Man Dying on Street, AOL NEWS, Feb. 2, 2009, 
http://www.aolnews.com/story/people-ignore-man-dying-on-street/325776. NBC News, Wash., 
D.C., Feb. 1, 2009, http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Passers-By-Ignore-Brutally-Beaten-
Homeless-Man-on-Sidewalk.html.  There is a video of this incident on YouTube, 
http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=http%3A//www.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DG1r8
1Rkxu38  
 77. Pedestrians Ignore Man Dying on N.Y. Sidewalk, WCF COURIER, Apr. 25, 2010, 
http://wcfcourier.com/news/local/article_b4b49386-508c-11df-9632-001cc4c03286.html; Michael 
van Poppel, Pedestrians Ignore Dying Man on New York City Sidewalk, THAINDIAN NEWS, Apr. 25, 
2010, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world/pedestrians-ignore-dying-man-on-new-york-
city-sidewalk_100353804.html; Michael Connelly, Video Shows Multiple Pedestrians Ignore Dying 
Man on New York City Sidewalk, EXAMINER.COM, Apr. 20, 2010, http://www.examiner.com/ 
national-news-headlines-editor-in-national/video-shows-multiple-pedestrians-ignore-dying-man-on-
new-york-city-sidewalk; Adam Alter, Needless Death on a New York Street, PSYCHOL. TODAY, 
ALTERNATIVE TRUTHS, Apr. 30, 2010, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/alternative-
truths/201004/needless-death-new-york-street. 
 78. Stephane Massinon, No Good Samaritan for Dying Crash Victim; Police Say Drivers 
Ignoring Bodies on City Streets, CALGARY HERALD, Aug. 22, 2010, available at 
http://www2.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/city/story.html?id=46c487b1-ff79-488e-a26e-
ea7e88024a71. 
 79. We need not debate those who reject the theory of evolution.  We can compromise: we 
can agree that I am not descended from the lower forms of life but you are. 
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stopping to use our cell phone to take a photograph of the incident.  
There is much evidence that the lower forms of life are more highly 
evolved that we are.  For example, Bengal tigers nurse piglets.  Bonobo 
apes (pigmy chimpanzees) are our closest ancestors.  They help 
wounded birds to fly.  A rhesus monkey will forgo the opportunity for 
food if pulling the chain that delivers the food will also electrically 
shock a companion  Seals (who are further down the evolutionary ladder 
than we are) rescue drowning dogs.80 
We think of ourselves as more highly evolved than monkeys or 
seals, who represent a lower form of life.  How would we act if pulling 
the chain would cause an electric shock to another human?  Do we still 
want the food?  We might not do it for a banana, but we will do it for 
fifteen minutes of fame.  The state-owned France 2 television channel 
recently aired a documentary about a fictional television show.  As is all 
too often the case, the psychologists who conducted the experiment that 
led to the documentary were not entirely truthful to the participants.  The 
experimenters recruited eighty volunteers and told them they would 
participate in a pilot for a new television show.  The fake game show-
reality program was called, “Le jeu de la mort,” or “The Game of 
Death.”  The participants were ordinary French citizens who signed a 
contract saying that they would obey the presenter’s instructions.81  They 
did so, perhaps because they wanted their fifteen minutes of fame on 
television.  
The glamorous hostess told the participants to administer electric 
shocks to rival contestants if they answered certain questions incorrectly.  
The participants dutifully did so, as they saw their rivals writhing in 
pain.  Members of the studio audience, who also thought the “game” was 
real, chanted “punishment,” and urged the participants to increases the 
shock to what they thought were the other “players” (who were really 
actors).  The participants saw the other “players” twisting with pain.  
The hostess told the participants that each time they pulled the lever the 
 
 80. FRANS DE WAAL, THE AGE OF EMPATHY:  NATURE’S LESSONS FOR A KINDER SOCIETY 
(2009).  De Waal’s research showed that altruism, not brute strength, is what is important for 
chimps.  The “size and strength of male chimps is an extremely poor predictor of which animals 
will dominate the troop.  Instead, the ability to forge social connections and engage in ‘diplomacy’ 
is often much more important.”  Jonah Lehrer, The Power Trip, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2010, at W1, 
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704407804575425561952689390.html. 
 81. CBC News, Reality TV Lures Players into Sadistic Game, Mar. 17, 2010, 
http://www.cbc.ca/arts/tv/story/2010/03/17/game-of-death.html; L’AFP, Channel 9 News, 9MSN, 
Contestants Torture Victims in “TV Show,” Mar. 17 2010, http://news.ninemsn.com.au/ 
article.aspx?id=1028367. 
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voltage of the shocks would increase.  And pull the lever they did:  they 
increased the electric shock to what they thought were 460 volts of 
electricity when the rival game show participant gave the wrong answer.  
Finally, their cries of “Let me go!” fell silent, and then the “players” 
appeared to die. 82 
In spite of these cries, only 18% of the participants refused the 
host’s request to pull the lever.  Out of eighty players, only sixteen 
walked out while sixty-four kept pulling the lever up to the maximum of 
460 volts until the “player” appeared to die.  The majority were just 
following the crowd.  The herd mentality even affected one of the sixty-
four participants who had Jewish grandparents who had suffered under 
the Nazis.  Later she said, “Since I was a little girl, I have always asked 
myself why they [the Nazis] did it.  How could they obey such orders?  
And there I was, obeying them myself.”  Another said, “I was worried 
about the contestant.  At the same time, I was afraid to spoil the 
program.”83 
We like to think that we are sophisticated.  And, in the totem pole 
of sophistication, many of us would probably put the French at the top.  
Yet, our veneer of civilization is much thinner than we would like.  
Remember, a rhesus monkey will forgo the opportunity for food if 
pulling the chain that delivers the food will also electrically shock a 
companion.84  But 80% of humans who participated in this fake game 
show had no trouble following the herd and shocking another human. 
This French game show replicated the results of a much earlier, 
famous experiment that Professor Luban discussed.85  It is called the 
Milgram Experiment, named after Dr. Stanley Milgram.  The 
experimenter told the “teacher” that he or she was supposed to teach a 
“student” to memorize a pair of words.  The punishment for a wrong 
answer was a shock from the “shock machine.”  This machine had thirty 
levers, each clearly labeled with a voltage designation ranging from 
fifteen volts (“slight shock”) to 450 volts (“danger: severe shock”).  The 
last switch was labeled “XXX.”  This is like the carrot and stick, but 
without the carrot. 
Milgram found that about 65% of the participants followed orders 
to inflict what they thought were increasingly painful electric shocks on 
an innocent person because the experimenter ordered them to do so.  
 
 82. CBC News, supra note 81; L’AFP, supra note 81. 
 83. CBC News, supra note 81; L’AFP, supra note 81.  
 84. DE WAAL, supra note 80, at 75.  J. Masserman, M.S. Wechkin, & W. Terris, Altruistic 
Behavior in Rhesus Monkeys, 121 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584-85 (1964). 
 85. Luban, supra note 61. 
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They administered the “shocks” even though the “student” screamed and 
begged them to stop.  Instead, the typical “teacher” just followed orders.  
The machine did not really administer shocks, but the teacher did not 
know that.  With each “student’s” mistake, the experimenter told the 
“teacher” to administer a stronger shock.  Eventually, the “student” 
stopped and fell silent, as if unconscious or dead.86 
Within all of us are both the good Dr. Henry Jekyll and the evil Mr. 
Edward Hyde. 
VII.  ALTRUISM AND THE CROWD 
Our willingness to follow orders actually offers some hope because 
we are more likely to do the right thing if someone singles us out and 
asks us to be altruistic.  We are more likely to follow that request, 
perhaps because we are no longer anonymous.  We are more likely to act 
altruistically—to follow the best traits of the lower forms of life on the 
evolutionary scale—if we think someone is looking.  A recent 
economics experiment illustrates this point.  It is based on a version of 
the “dictator’s game.”87  The experiment gives one person a sum of 
money, let us say $10, to Player A, who is the “dictator.”  The dictator is 
in charge and makes all the rules.  Whatever the dictator decides is final. 
This dictator can, if she chooses, divide that $10 between herself 
and Player B.  She can give away to Player B some of the cash, all the 
cash, or none of the cash.  Whatever the dictator gives is a gift, and the 
gift can be zero.  A significant majority of the dictators are altruistic; 
although they can do whatever they want, they will give 20% or more of 
their money to Player B, if the dictator and Player B are anonymous with 
respect to each other but the dictator is not anonymous with respect to 
the experimenter.  However, those statistics are reversed if the dictator 
 
 86. Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOL. 371-78 (1963); STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY:  AN EXPERIMENTAL 
VIEW (1974); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT:  UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE 
TURN EVIL (2007).  Professor Zimbardo conducted the Stanford Prison Experiment in 1971, another 
study that showed how easy it was to turn pacifists into sadistic prison guards.  See also Elizabeth 
Landau, Charting the Psychology of Evil, Decades after “Shock” Experiment, CNN.com, Dec. 19, 
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/12/19/milgram.experiment.obedience/. 
 87.  Karl Schurter & Bart J. Wilson, Justice and Fairness in the Dictator Game, 76 S. ECON. 
J. 130–145 (2009).  Magnus Johannesson & Björn Persson, Non-Reciprocal Altruism in Dictator 
Games, 69 ECON. LETTERS 137-42, 137 (Nov. 2000) (using a double blind experiment, so that the 
decision of each dictator is anonymous both with respect to other subjects in the experiment and 
with respect to the experimenter, this double blind procedure significantly decreased the proportion 
of dictators who donated anything to 36% and the average donation decreased to 9% of the amount 
allocated). 
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has complete anonymity from both Player B and the experimenter.  If 
the dictator knows that even the experimenter is in the dark—there is 
complete anonymity—then over 60% of the dictators keep everything 
for themselves and give no money to Player B.  In short, if the dictator 
knows that the experimenter is watching (but Player B is in the dark), the 
dictator is much more likely to give money to Player B.  If the dictator 
knows that no one is watching, the dictator becomes less altruistic.  
When we think that someone is watching us in particular and looking at 
us—when we are not anonymous—we behave better and are more likely 
to be altruistic.88 
Dr. Milgram conducted another experiment, not nearly as well 
known as his electric shock experiment, and its results also support this 
conclusion.  His students boarded a crowded New York subway and 
asked someone already sitting down for his or her seat.  About 68% of 
the people, if asked directly for a seat, got up and surrendered the seat.89  
In New York City!  One male student asked an elderly female for her 
seat.  The woman said that she would not give up her seat.  Then, the 
woman’s neighbor, a man, apparently felt bad by her rejection and so he 
offered the male student his seat.  In a variation of the experiment, the 
experimenter asked for the seat but gave a lame excuse:  he or she would 
hold up a paperback book and said, “Excuse me. May I have your seat?  
I can’t read my book standing up.”  With this version, the percentage 
who gave up the seat dropped to 38%,90 still a respectable percentage for 
hardened New Yorkers. 
When the stranger singles us out, personally talks to us, and asks us 
for our seat, we are not anonymous as to him.  If someone takes charge 
and says, “May I have your seat on this subway,” then we are more 
 
 88. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe & Vernon L. Smith, Social Distance and Other—
Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653-60 (1996).  See also Schurter & 
Wilson, supra note 87.  There is another version of the dictator game where the experimenters take 
videos of people in a mall who are the subject of the experiment.  The people know that others can 
watch them:  when people in the dictator’s party can watch them live on a video feed as the dictator 
makes the decision, they give $5 more (out of a $20 pie) than when they cannot watch.  Indeed, 
there are a lot of people who give everything away when they are being watched by the 
experimenter in a mall.  Here is a sample of the decisions:  SMILE, DICTATOR, YOU’RE ON CAMERA, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZHN8xyp6Y0 (Nov. 8, 2010).  The dictator gives away even 
more money if the dictator thinks that Player B is an established charity instead of an anonymous 
student.  Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games, 16 
GAMES AND ECON. BEHAV. 181–91 (1996), http://community.middlebury.edu/~jcarpent/EC499/ 
Eckel%20and%20Grossman%201996%20GEB.pdf. 
 89. Michael Luo, “Excuse Me.  May I Have Your Seat?”: Revisiting a Social Experiment, 
And the Fear That Goes With It, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2004, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D05E4DF1130F937A2575AC0A9629C8B63. 
 90. Luo, supra note 89. 
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likely to give up our seat.  Someone is looking at us and we are not 
anonymous.  We might assume the questioner may be sick because we 
do not think that people will just tell a lie out of the blue.  (By the way, 
the students in this experiment did not like to ask for a seat; they thought 
that it was unethical to give a false impression because their question 
suggested that they were sick.)91  If the questioner does look sick but 
does not ask us for a seat, we are not altruistic.92  Then, we are just one 
of many anonymous people in the subway and anonymity tends to bring 
out the darker side of our nature. 
VIII.  CREATING AN ETHICAL CULTURE:  THE IN-HOUSE GENERAL 
COUNSEL 
It is easy for a young associate or even a partner to be anonymous 
in a large firm.  There are many lawyers who do not know their 
colleagues.  In the old days, at least a common parking lot bound the law 
firm together, but that is no longer true because the law firm’s offices 
stretch out over many cities.  The lawyers know that the ones who do not 
contribute sufficiently to the firm’s bottom line will find themselves 
shown the exit door.93  This large turnover does not encourage loyalty to 
the firm. 
In addition, there are financial incentives to keep the client happy.  
For the law firm as a whole, a client, even a major client, may constitute 
a miniscule portion of the law firm’s profits.  But for the particular 
partner in charge of the client’s work, that client may represent a 
substantial part of that lawyer’s billings.94  Similarly, the associate may 
find herself working primarily on one client’s case.  In these 
circumstances, it is financially difficult for the lawyer to tell that client 
that what he or she asks is wrong, because the client may move 
elsewhere, to a law firm that is less ethically concerned. 
Add to this mix the fact that psychologists tell us that we tend to 
follow orders.  Granted, the ethics rules tell us that there is no defense to 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. E.g., Dan DiPietro & Gretta Rusanow, Trench Warfare:  Citi’s Midyear Law Firm 
Review, AM. LAWYER, Sept. 8, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/ 
PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202471736060&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (“Most firms reduced equity 
partner head count in the first half of 2010, so it’s clear that this is a focal point.  We believe it will 
continue to be a priority throughout 2010.”); Debra Cassens Weiss, Report Predicts More Equity 
Partners Will Be Axed, Sees More Outsourced Work, ABA JOURNAL:  LAW NEWS NOW, Sept. 8, 
2010, http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/article/report_predicts_more_equity_partners_will_ 
be_axed_sees_more_outsourced_work. 
 94. Rotunda, supra note 45. 
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following bad orders.95  But the existence of that principle does not make 
it easy for the associate to challenge the partner or for the partner to 
challenge his major client and tell him that either he will turn over the 
document or the client can walk out the door.  However, a law firm will 
make it easier for the associate or the partner to do the right thing if it 
creates a structure that overcomes these disincentives to be ethical.  The 
firm should create incentive to encourage the younger lawyers to ask 
questions without feeling that they are being insubordinate. 
If one of the anonymous lawyers in a large firm challenges the 
senior associate or junior partner, that can be risky.  Or, the young 
lawyer may believe that it would be risky to challenge the superior.  To 
whom, then, should the lawyer raise questions?  If the lawyer raises the 
ethical question to one of the supervisory lawyers, what does she do if 
she is also concerned but she is not certain of the right course of action?  
If the ethical question is difficult (and the most interesting questions are 
the more difficult ones), the law firm could hire outside counsel to 
consider the issue.  Law firms do in fact do that at times, but that is also 
not the first alternative that the firm would grasp because the decision to 
hire outside lawyers is costly. 
Let me share an old war story from years ago.  A client did not 
want to disclose a particular document; instead, he wanted to get rid of 
it.  I told the senior associate, and he told me that the partners did not 
want to know about it.  However, I did not like that result.  I wrote a 
legal memorandum politely describing the problem and discussing the 
case law requiring us to turn over the document.  I sent it to the partners 
who promptly overruled the senior associate and turned over the 
document.  Later, one of the partners called me in his office and thanked 
me for what I had done.  “We could have gotten into a problem over 
that,” he said.  The partner was promoting the right culture. 
I did not lightly make the decision to go over the head of the 
associate in charge.  It was not easy.  However, the number of lawyers in 
the law firm was not that large (fewer than seventy lawyers), so I knew 
them and they knew me.  That decision would have been harder for a 
young lawyer to make in a large, anonymous law firm.  And, for many 
people, it would be harder to make in an uncertain economic climate. 
Fortunately, there is another alternative.  The firm could appoint 
one of its partners as its own in-house general counsel.  This in-house 
 
 95. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2(a) (2009) (“A lawyer is bound by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.”).  
Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law Firm Associates, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 199 
(2007). 
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counsel can offer candid and confidential advice to the younger lawyers.  
The creation of this office will signal that the law firm wants to create 
the right culture, and foster the right habits.96 
The in-house counsel is likely to be more objective than the lawyers 
initially involved with the matter.  For one thing, the in-house counsel 
will not be personally involved with the particular matter.  If the client is 
the problem, she should be viewing the client as a client of “the firm” 
rather than a client of the particular billing partner.  The in-house 
counsel will make the decision more objectively than either the partner 
in charge or the senior associate.  That is because the client’s billings 
may represent 20% or more of the billings of the partner or associate, but 
only a minute percentage of the billings of the entire law firm.  If 
necessary, the in-house counsel can decide whether the issue is such that 
she should kick it upstairs to the relevant law firm committee (such as 
the committee that decides if there is a disqualification issue or a conflict 
of interests). 
As discussed below, when the firm creates an in-house ethics 
counsel to whom partners and associates can easily confide about ethics 
issues, they promote the development of a culture of ethics.  The 
existence of an in-house ethics counsel sends an important signal to all 
the lawyers in the firm.  The associate can simply talk to another lawyer 
(the in-house counsel) confidentially.  There is no need to go over 
anyone’s head.  The law firm does not have to decide if the issue is 
worth the expense of hiring outside counsel. 
If there is no in-house counsel to whom the junior associate can 
turn, the junior associate is less likely to turn to anyone.  If others who 
hear Kitty Genovese’s plea for help do not respond, we are also less 
likely to respond and more likely to follow the herd of indifference.  If 
the junior associate sees that the senior associate and the billing partner 
have decided not to turn over the document, it is harder for the junior 
associate to go over their heads and make waves.  But it is easy to walk 
down the hall for a confidential conversation with the in-house counsel. 
It is often difficult to make the initial decision to get involved.  But 
if the firm makes that decision easier, more people are likely to make the 
first step.  If we can easily and confidentially seek the solace of the in-
house general counsel, we are less likely to follow the herd.  Just as it is 
easy to ask inside counsel, it is a lot bigger step to seek the solace of the 
law firm’s outside counsel; it is a particularly big step for junior 
 
 96. Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management:  Complementary Visions of 
Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 108-10 (2008). 
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associates.  The existence of an in-house general counsel should 
encourage junior partners or associates (particularly junior associates) to 
report suspicions in a way that does not disadvantage those who do 
report. 
Thus, it is becoming more common for law firms to appoint one of 
the partnership’s lawyers as “general counsel” to the law firm.97  A 
survey of the largest 197 law firms in 2005 reported that nearly 70% 
now have a designated general counsel.  That is up from 63% in the 
prior year.  Each is an inside counsel rather than an outside general 
counsel (i.e., a lawyer in another law firm), and 92% of these general 
counsel are also partners in their firm.98 
It should take little effort for the young associate to turn to this 
general counsel, who may be the lawyer down the hall or on the next 
floor, in order to seek candid advice.  When a lawyer sees a problem—or 
thinks she sees a problem but she is not sure and her colleagues do 
nothing—she can inform the general counsel about what she sees and 
know that she is speaking confidentially.  The general counsel, by 
definition, will not be one of the passive bystanders who chose to walk 
around the fallen body crying for help.  That is because it is the business 
of the general counsel to be involved; that is part of her job description.  
If the lawyer can confidentially seek advice or report to a general 
counsel, then that lawyer is less likely to passively do nothing. 
The general counsel should aid in creating good habits.  And, if the 
general counsel concludes there is no problem, the junior lawyer will 
have ethical reasons to defer to that decision.99  If there is a problem, the 
inside counsel can take appropriate action to correct it.  The empirical 
 
 97. Jonathan M. Epstein, The In-House Ethics Advisor:  Practical Benefits for the Modern 
Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011 (1994); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The 
Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large 
Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2002); Douglas R. Richmond, Essential Principles for Law Firm 
General Counsel, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 805 (2005); Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm 
Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721 (2005) [hereinafter Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm 
Privilege]; Susan Saab Fortney, Law Firm General Counsel as Sherpa: Challenges Facing the In-
Firm Lawyer's Lawyer, 53 U. KAN. L. REV 835 (2005); Elizabeth Chambliss, The 
Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1515 (2006) [hereinafter 
Chambliss, Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel]; Davis, supra note 96. 
 98. Results of Confidential “Flash” Survey on Law Firm General Counsel, (Mar. 2005), 
http://www.altmanweil.com/dir_docs/resource/d0f1e347-e90b-40ae-9b92-
808a7eff6ffd_document.pdf.  See also Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 97; Chambliss, 
Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel, supra note 97 (law firms are increasingly 
relying on full-time in-house counsel); Davis, supra note 96. 
 99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2(b) (2009) (subordinate lawyer does not violate 
the ethics rules by acting in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an 
arguable ethical issue). 
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evidence demonstrates that: one study showed that, over a five-year 
period, law firms that employ a general counsel (or similar position, 
such as ethics advisor or loss prevention counsel) spend $1 million less 
on defense costs and indemnity payments in connection with malpractice 
claims.100  Because these firms are more ethical, they have fewer 
malpractice claims. 
The law should encourage law firms to create an in-house legal 
counsel.101  The ethics rules authorize lawyers to seek confidential 
advice from other lawyers about their ethical duties.102  Although the 
ABA Model Rules do not use the title “in-house counsel,” they do 
specifically contemplate that law firms, particularly larger firms, may 
designate a senior lawyer as a designated ethics lawyer.103  The ABA 
advises that a lawyer who consults the law firm’s general counsel in an 
effort to conform her conduct to the ethics rules is not engaging in a 
conflict of interest with the client.  Instead, she is engaging in an 
“inherent” part of her work.104 
 
 100. Anthony E. Davis, The Emergence of Law Firm General Counsel and the Challenges 
Ahead, 20 PROF. LAWYER, no. 2, 2010, at 1. 
 101. Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v. Marland, No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007 U.S. Dist. 2007 WL 
578989, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (The court recognizes that law firms should and do seek 
advice about their legal and ethical obligations in connection with representing a client and that 
firms normally seek this advice from their own lawyers.  Indeed, many firms have in-house ethics 
advisers for this purpose.  A rule requiring disclosure of all communications relating to a client 
would dissuade attorneys from referring ethical problems to other lawyers, thereby undermining 
conformity with ethical obligations.  Such a rule would also make conformity costly by forcing the 
firm either to retain outside counsel or terminate an existing attorney-client relationship to ensure 
confidentiality of all communications relating to that client.  This court declines to follow such a 
strict rule, preferring one that is consistent with a law firm in-house ethical infrastructure.  
Accordingly, Thelen is to produce some but not all communications in which a Thelen lawyer seeks 
or gives advice on the firm’s ethical obligations to Marland.).  Versuslaw, Inc. v. Stoel Rives, LLP, 
111 P.3d 866, 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (“Lawyers in a law firm seeking legal advice from 
another lawyer in the same firm can assert the attorney-client privilege”) (citing U. S. v. Rowe, 96 
F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996)); Hertzog, Calamari & Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co., 850 F. Supp. 255 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re: Sunrise Securities Litigation, 130 F.R.D. 560 (E.D.Pa. 1989). 
 102. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) (2009) (lawyer may seek advice of other 
lawyer about ethical duties without losing confidentially) and R. 5.1(a) (law firm should have 
measures in effect to assure that law firm complies with its ethical obligations). 
 103. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1,cmt. 3 (2009). 
 104. In-House Consulting on Ethical Issues, ABA Formal Ethics Op. 08-453 (Oct. 17, 2008), 
quoting N. Y. St. B. Assoc. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Consultation with a Law Firm's In-House 
Counsel on Matters of Professional Ethics Involving One or More Clients of the Law Firm, Op. 789 
(Oct. 26, 2005), 2005 WL 3046319, at *3 (“A lawyer's interest in carrying out the ethical 
obligations imposed by the Code is not an interest extraneous to the representation of the client.  It 
is inherent in that representation and a required part of the work in carrying out the 
representation.”).  
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Lawyers are less likely to violate the ethics rules when they seek 
objective advice from other lawyers about their ethical duties—e.g., is 
there a conflict of interest with another client,105 or is there a conflict 
with the lawyer’s personal interest;106 or is a client’s prospective waiver 
of a conflict of interest still valid in light of changing factual 
circumstances;107 or, must the law firm withdraw from a particular case 
because of the client’s misstatements during discovery.108 
Instead of encouraging law firms to appoint a general counsel, 
several cases have shown hostility by denying the attorney-client 
privilege to lawyers who consult their law firm’s in-house general 
counsel.109  The lawyer seeks legal advice from the general counsel on 
what to do in order to comply with the ethics rules.  These cases argue 
that there should be no attorney-client privilege because the lawyer who 
consults with the law firm’s in-house counsel is in a conflict of interest 
with the law firm’s fiduciary duties to its client.  That, says the courts, 
should cause the lawyer to lose the privilege.  As one court argued: 
Permeating the documents is consideration of how best to position the 
firm in light of a possible malpractice action.  They clearly establish 
that the law firm was in a conflict of interest relationship with its 
clients.110  
 
 105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009). 
 106. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (2009). 
 107. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 8, at § 1.7-4(b); Davis, supra note 96, at 102. 
 108. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(3). 
 109. E.g., In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, 130 F.R.D. 560, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (“[A] law 
firm’s communication with in[-]house counsel is not protected by the attorney client privilege if the 
communication implicates or creates a conflict between the law firm’s fiduciary duties to itself and 
its duties to the client seeking to discover the communication.”); Koen Book Distrib. v. Powell, 
Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 285 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“[T]o 
the extent that the seeking or obtaining of legal advice by one lawyer from another lawyer inside the 
firm ‘implicates or creates a conflict of interest,’ the attorney-client privilege between the lawyers in 
the firm is vitiated.”) (footnote omitted); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 
220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“law firm cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege 
against a current client when performing a conflict check in furtherance of representing that client”); 
Asset Funding Group, LLC v. Adams & Reese, LLP, No. 07-2965, 2008 U.S. Dist. 2008 WL 
4948835, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2008); In re: SonicBlue Inc., Bankr. Nos. 03-51775, 03-51776, 
03-51777, 03-51778-MM, 2008 U.S. Bankr. Ct. 2008 WL 170562, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 
2008) (no privilege for the law firm because there was conflict of interest when the firm sought 
advice from another lawyer within the same firm). 
 110. Koen Book Distrib., 212 F.R.D. at 286.  In re Sunrise Securities, 130 F.R.D.at 595.  See 
also Burns ex rel. Office of Public Guardian v. Hale and Dorr LLP, 242 F.R.D. 170, 173 (D. Mass. 
2007) (“The ‘client’ invoking the privilege is H & D itself, which is being represented by another 
lawyer of the firm.  Because the firm owed a fiduciary duty to Alexis Burns as the trust beneficiary, 
there is no policy reason why H & D should be allowed to withhold disclosure of information 
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Yet, in identical circumstances, these courts appear to be quite 
willing to protect the law firm’s communications with its outside 
counsel.111  That distinction makes little sense.  If a lawyer really cannot 
confidentially consult with a lawyer in the same law firm about his or 
her ethical duties, then consulting with a lawyer in a different law firm is 
not any different.112  It is just more expensive.  If the lawyer seeks legal 
advice on what to do in order to comply with the ethics rules (including 
the ethical obligation of competence)113 it should make no difference to 
treat one consultation as a breach of fiduciary duties and the other as 
proper.  Instead of encouraging lawyers to seek ethics advice, these 
cases serve to discourage that alternative by prescribing a procedure that 
is more costly. 
The principle that motivates these courts—the argument that there 
is an inherent conflict of interest when the lawyer seeks advice of the in-
house general counsel—is false.  Assume for example, that the in-house 
general counsel advises a lawyer in the firm that this lawyer has 
committed malpractice.  The ethics rules envisage that the law firm 
should advise the firm’s client of the possible malpractice.114  It does not 
matter whether inside counsel or outside counsel has advised that there 
is malpractice.  The case law shows that if the law firm discovers that it 
has committed malpractice, the lawyer should inform the law firm’s 
client,115 as part of its duty to keep the client well-informed.116  The law 
 
relevant to her claim.  Because the privilege is inapplicable to this circumstance, the plaintiff's 
motion to compel will be allowed.”). 
 111. In re Sunrise Securities, 130 F.R.D. at 597 n.12.  See also Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Tedford, No. 3:07CV73-A-A, 2009 U.S. Dist. 2009 WL 2425841, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 6, 2009). 
 112. William T. Barker, Law Firm In-House Attorney-Client Privilege Vis-à-Vis Current 
Clients, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 467, 471 (2003). 
 113. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009).  It is no accident that competence is 
the first rule.  The drafters believed that the first rule, the prime directive, is competence.  ROTUNDA 
& DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 8, at § 1.1-1 (“Competence:  the First Rule of Ethics”) (Thomson 
West, 2010-2011 ed.). 
 114. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 & cmt. 3 (2009) (duty to inform client of 
“significant developments affecting” the representation), and cmt.  7 (“lawyer may not withhold 
information to serve the lawyer’s own interest”).  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) 
& cmt. 9 (2009).  See also In-House Consulting on Ethical Issues, ABA Formal Ethics Op. 08-453 
(Oct. 17, 2008) (“Duty to Inform the Client of an Ethics Consultation”). 
 115. For example of inside counsel delivering the bad news, see Versuslaw, Inc. v. Stoel Rives, 
111 P.3d 866, 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).  Lawyer Elvins was the Stoel Rives lawyer who 
represented VersusLaw in its arbitration with Matthew Bender.  Lawyer Dean was Stoel Rives' in-
house counsel (its loss prevention lawyer).  Dean provided legal advice to Stoel Rives attorneys on 
ethical and legal issues.  Dean advised Elvins about Stoel Rives’ representation of VersusLaw in the 
arbitration and the two-year limitation for filing VersusLaw’s claim for royalties under the License 
Agreement.  When Elvins learned about a possible malpractice claim that its client could have 
against Elvins and the Stoel Rives law firm, Elvins informed Acton, the President and CEO of 
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firm’s obligation does not depend on whether inside or outside counsel 
has delivered the bad news.117 
Lawyers are always supposed to do what they can to protect 
themselves from a malpractice lawsuit; that is called acting competently.  
It is not a conflict of interests for the lawyer to seek advice from another 
lawyer about what she should do to act competently and ethically.118  
The law firm benefits both the client and itself when it creates 
procedures to assure that it acts competently and without conflicts.  The 
ethics rules require that.119  Because the factual landscape is always 
changing and lawyers must apply the law to these changing situations, 
lawyers must constantly determine if they have violated any ethical 
rules.  The ethical rules also place limits on how the lawyer can protect 
herself from malpractice: the lawyer may not ethically ask the client to 
sign a retainer agreement waving his right to sue for malpractice.120  But 
that limitation is a far cry from a rule that denies the attorney-client 
privilege to lawyers merely because they seek legal advice on how best 
to comply with their ethical duties.  The ethics rules and good law firm 
practices “create an obligation to establish protocols, appropriate for the 
size and practice of the firm, to enable the firm to enforce these 
standards internally.  To envision such a system without access to 
confidential advice on legal and ethical issues affecting the firm's 
obligations is difficult.”121 
Thus, the ABA Model Rules specifically authorize the lawyer to 
seek confidential legal advice in order for the lawyer and law firm to 
 
VersusLaw.  See also, In re SRC Holding Corp., 364 B.R. 1, 37-42 (D. Minn. 2007) (law firm has 
duty to inform its client about malpractice claim that client may have against it) (no general 
counsel). 
 116. See supra note 114. 
 117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20, cmt. c (2000) (“If the 
lawyer's conduct of the matter gives the client a substantial malpractice claim against the lawyer, the 
lawyer must disclose that to the client.  For example, a lawyer who fails to file suit for a client 
within the limitations period must so inform the client, pointing out the possibility of a malpractice 
suit and the resulting conflict of interest that may require the lawyer to withdraw.”). 
 118. N. Y. St. B. Assoc. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Consultation with a Law Firm's In-House 
Counsel on Matters of Professional Ethics Involving One or More Clients of the Law Firm, Op. 789 
(Oct. 26, 2005), 2005 WL 3046319, at *3. 
 119. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2009), requiring the firm “shall make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all 
lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” 
 120. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h)(1) (2009). 
 121. N. Y. St. B. Assoc. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Consultation with a Law Firm's In-House 
Counsel on Matters of Professional Ethics Involving One or More Clients of the Law Firm, Op. 789 
(Oct. 26, 2005), 2005 WL 3046319, at *2. 
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comply with the ethics rules.122  The ethics rules encourage lawyers to 
seek confidential advice from other lawyers in order to comply with 
their ethical duties of competence as well as their other ethical duties.123  
The Rules make no distinction between consulting a lawyer outside the 
law firm versus consulting a lawyer inside the law firm.124 
If lawyers must hire outside counsel in order to be protected by the 
privilege, it will be more expensive to seek advice, and that means fewer 
lawyers will seek the advice.  In particular, younger lawyers, the junior 
associates, are a lot less likely to tell the partner that they need to seek 
outside legal advice to second guess what another partner is doing.  It is 
a lot easier for the junior associate simply to walk down the hall or take 
the elevator to another floor and talk in confidence to the in-house 
counsel, whose job is to be the independent legal ear and independent 
conscience.  Instead of encouraging this consultation, many courts are 
discouraging it.  They are creating a regime where the junior associate 
has to tell the partner, “I am not sure that what you are doing is right; I 
want the law firm to pay to hire an outside counsel to second-guess 
you.” 
The law should encourage lawyers to consult other lawyers on legal 
ethics issues for the same reason that the law encourages corporations to 
consult with their in-house counsel.125  The attorney-client privilege 
encourages the client (in this case, the associate or partner with the 
ethics question) to speak candidly.  It also encourages the general 
counsel of the firm to respond candidly.  The privilege should encourage 
the in-house general counsel to conduct an internal investigation if that 
is appropriate, just as in-house corporate counsel conduct internal 
investigations when appropriate to keep the client out of trouble.  The 
lawyer who becomes in-house counsel develops expertise on such issues 
 
 122. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) & cmt. 9 (2009).  See also In-House 
Consulting on Ethical Issues, ABA Formal Ethics Op. 08-453 (Oct. 17, 2008) (“The Model Rules 
contemplate the existence of some structure or process within a firm for resolution of questions 
about professional conduct . . . .”) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2009)). 
 123. In fact, lawyers can make disclosures that would otherwise violate their duty of 
confidentiality in order to protect themselves from a charge of wrongful conduct.  MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5). 
 124. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 9 (2009). 
 125. Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, supra note 97.  See also, e.g., United States v. 
Buitrago-Dugand, 712 F. Supp. 1045, 1048 (D.P.R. 1989) (“The attorney-client privilege exists to 
encourage people to seek legal advice freely and to speak candidly to the attorney without fear that 
the communication will be disclosed.”); United States v. Saccoccia, 898 F. Supp. 53, 57 (D.R.I. 
1995) (“The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage the client to make full 
disclosure of all pertinent facts to the attorney so that the attorney may render informed legal advice 
with respect to the matters about which the attorney is consulted.”). 
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as conflicts of interest, applicability of attorney-client privilege, and so 
on.  Of course the law firm has a fiduciary duty to its client, but, as 
Professor Elizabeth Chambliss has pointed out, the law firm’s in-house 
counsel has a duty to the law firm, and courts should encourage this 
development.126 
The law firm’s general counsel is more likely to be objective 
regarding a particularly lucrative client than the lawyer whose billings 
disproportionately depend on that particular client.  A lawyer whose 
status and rank within the law firm depends on a major client is more 
likely to rationalize that what the client is doing is permissible.  For 
example, the lawyer will strive mightily not to confront that client with a 
charge that the lawyer thinks the client has concealed a document that 
should be turned over in discovery.  If the law firm confronts the client 
and loses the client, the law firm suffers a slight loss in business; if the 
billing partner confronts the client and loses the client, that partner may 
lose 20% or more of her entire billings.127 
And speaking of lawyers billing hours, let us turn to the issue of 
ethics of billing. 
IX.  BILLING HOURS AND ETHICAL HABITS  
Aristotle tells us, in his Nicomachean Ethics, that we become 
ethical by building good habits and we become unethical by building 
bad habits:  “excellence of character results from habit, whence it has 
acquired its name (êthikê) by a slight modification of the word ethos 
(habit).”128  Excellence of character comes from following the right 
habits. 
 
 126. Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, supra note 97, at 1723-24. 
 127. Lawyers want to move up the law firm structure, from associates to partners, and from 
low-level partners to high-level partners.  See Galanter & Palay, supra note 23; David B. Wilkins & 
G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information 
Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998).  Ethics rules 
place some restrictions on lawyer mobility while market forces may encourage it.  Jack P. Sahl, 
Thinking about Leaving? The Ethics of Departing One Firm for Another, 18 PROF. LAWYER, no. 1, 
2008, at 2. 
 128. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS BOOKS II-IV bk. II, at 1 (C.C.W. Taylor ed., trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2006).  The first sentence of Book II, Chapter 1, states: 
Excellence being then twofold, excellence of thought on the one hand and excellence of 
character on the other, excellence of thought comes into being and develops chiefly 
through teaching, which is why it requires experience and time, but excellence of 
character results from habit, whence it has acquired its name (êthikê) by a slight 
modification of the word ethos (habit). 
Id. 
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Thinking of ethics as habit-forming may sound unusual to the 
modern mind, but not to Aristotle or the medieval thinkers who grew up 
in his long shadow.  “Habit” in Greek is “ethos,” from which we get our 
modern word, “ethical.”  In Latin, habits are moralis, which gives us the 
word, “moral.”  Aristotle explains that we cannot alter nature by 
practice: we cannot teach or train a rock to roll up a hill no matter how 
often we throw it up.  But we can alter ourselves by practice.  We can 
train ourselves to be ethical by practice, just as we learn to play the harp 
by practice.129 
If Aristotle lived in modern times, he might explain what he meant 
in this way.  Is it ethical to punish a person who makes a mistake while 
driving (e.g., once, he failed to make a full stop at the stop sign) and then 
kills a pedestrian?  The driver, after all, did not intend to kill anyone; he 
just made a mistake.  We say that he made a negligent mistake, but that 
only means that someone who is not negligent—the hypothetical 
“reasonable person” in the law of torts—would not have made the 
mistake.  Is it right to punish the person because just once he made a 
mistake and did not make a full stop at the stop sign?  He was not 
“reasonable” but he did the best that he could.  He was not intentionally 
bad. 
Aristotle might respond that it is not likely that the driver would 
spend his entire life coming to a full stop at every stop sign and then, one 
day, act contrary to the habits he had built over a lifetime.  Instead, it is 
much more likely that our driver would make a series of decisions and 
eventually act by habit.  He would stop at the stop sign, but then one day 
when he is in a hurry or it is late at night and no one is around, he would 
make a little less of a full stop.  Later, he would repeat that behavior.  
Over time, he would make fewer full stops and more rolling stops, even 
when he was not that much in a hurry.  Bit by bit, he would acquire a 
habit of not making full stops.  And then, one day, he would run the stop 
sign and injure or kill a pedestrian.  He slowly acquired a lifetime of bad 
habits. 
The virtuous or ethical person would be building up quite a 
different set of habits.  She would make a full stop at every stop sign.  
There would come a time when she was in a hurry, and it was late at 
night and no one was looking, and still she would come to a full stop.  
Like putting on a seat belt when you drive, eventually you have 
 
 129. Id. at 2-6.  On this issue, the philosophy of east and west meet.  Confucius said, “By 
nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart.”  CONFUCIUS, THE CONFUCIAN 
ANALECTS, THE GREAT LEARNING & THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN 318 (James Legge trans., 2009).  
There is nothing new under the sun. 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/3
8-ROTUNDA_44.3 PROOF-DONE.DOC 8/15/2011  1:58 PM 
2011] WHY LAWYERS ARE DIFFERENT AND WHY WE ARE THE SAME 713 
developed the habit of always making full stops.  The ethical person 
makes the conscious choice to do what it right and to develop the proper 
habits. 
The unethical person has made a different conscious choice, for 
example, the decision to lie.  With practice, we can become habitual 
liars.  We start off by making a conscious decision to lie.  Magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) studies tell us that it takes more effort for us to 
lie than to tell the truth.  The MRI shows structural abnormalities in 
people who habitually and pathologically lie, cheat, and deceive.  Liars 
had a 22% to 26% increase in their prefrontal white matter and a 
reduction of a 36% to 42% in their prefrontal grey/white ratios compared 
to normal people.130  Professor Adrian Raine, one of the authors of the 
study, said, “Lying takes a lot of effort.”131  People have to work at it.132  
And, like everything else, the more you work, the easier it becomes. 
There is, sadly, a great deal of empirical evidence that many 
lawyers have decided to become habitual liars about the number of 
billable hours they work.133  They are padding their bills and, over time, 
the padding becomes more frequent.  Eventually, their fraudulent billing 
becomes excessive enough that the client or law firm discovers the 
deceit. 
Consider a case that involved the billing practices of an up-and-
coming partner at Mayer, Brown & Platt.  When the law firm discovered 
what its partner, Richard A. Salomon, had done, it hired a national 
accounting firm to conduct an independent audit of Mr. Salomon’s bills 
and then reimbursed ten corporate litigation clients almost $500,000.  
 
 130. Yaling Yang et. al., Prefrontal White Matter  in Pathological Liars. 187 BRIT. J. OF 
PSYCHIATRY 320-25 (2005). 
 131. Usha Sutliff, Liars’ Brains Wired Differently, USC NEWS, Sept. 29, 2005, 
http://www.usc.edu/uscnews/stories/11655.html. 
 132. Joshua D. Greene & Joseph M. Paxton, Patterns of Neural Activity Associated with 
Honest and Dishonest Moral Decisions, 106 PNAS (PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., USA) 
12505-12511 (July 21, 2009), http://www.pnas.org/content/106/30/12506.full#abstract-1 
(“Individuals who behaved honestly exhibited no additional control-related activity (or other kind of 
activity) when choosing to behave honestly, as compared with a control condition in which there 
was no opportunity for dishonest gain.  In contrast, individuals who behaved dishonestly exhibited 
increased activity in control-related regions of prefrontal cortex, both when choosing to behave 
dishonestly and on occasions when they refrained from dishonesty.  Levels of activity in these 
regions correlated with the frequency of dishonesty in individuals.”) (emphasis added). 
 133. See, e.g., Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stahlbush, 126 Ohio St. 3d 366, 2010-Ohio-3823, 933 
N.E.2d 1091 (disciplining an attorney who billed the juvenile court for more than 24 hours per day 
on at least three occasions, and more than 20 hours per day on five other occasions, in 2006”).  In 
addition to billing over 24 hours a day on more than one occasion, Attorney Stahlbush billed 90.3 
hours in a 96-hour period “and in a separate 144-hour period, she billed 139.5 hours.”  Id.  
35
Rotunda: Why Lawyers are Different and Why We are the Same
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
8-ROTUNDA_44.3 PROOF-DONE.DOC 8/15/2011  1:58 PM 
714 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:679 
Salomon consistently billed more than 3000 hours per year.134  That is 
over eight billable hours, every day of the year.  There is no vacation, no 
weekend, and no July 4th barbeque.  A lawyer told me that one year he 
billed an honest 3000 hours but the next year he was in the hospital.  Not 
so for Mr. Salomon, who said he billed over 3000 hours one year after 
another.  Should any of his partners have suspected something was amiss 
at some point during all those years?  Compare these numbers with the 
average number of hours that a typical American works in a year: 1792.  
In the Netherlands, it is 1389.135  But for Mr. Salomon it was over 3000, 
year after year after year. 
Those who lie do not limit their lies to the number of hours billed.  
In another instance, also in Chicago, a very reputable lawyer for a very 
reputable law firm, Winston & Strawn, found himself caught in a 
financial scandal.136  He was padding his expense account since shortly 
after becoming managing partner.  And, when the law firm investigated, 
it found that like the person who makes the rolling stop, his padding did 
not stop there.  The law firm, when it found out what was happening, 
promptly demanded and received the partner’s resignation.137  It was not 
easy for the law firm to uncover the problem because the partner in 
charge of monitoring the law firm’s internal accounting was the 
fraudulent lawyer.138  The wolf guarded the chicken coop. 
 
 134. Sherrie F. Nachman, Mayer, Brown Partner Exiled, 16 THE AM. LAW. 26 (1994) (an ex-
partner said Salomon was “a pathological liar . . . [and] the most incredible overbiller.”); Randall 
Samborn, Mayer, Brown & Platt Overbillings Detailed, 16 NAT’L L. J., May 9, 1994, at A4, col. 4; 
Sidebar:  News of The Profession, 16 NAT’L L. J., June 27, 1994, at P. A5, col. 2 (“sources say Mr. 
Salomon, who claims to have suffered from an obsessive-compulsive disorder that led to the 
overbilling”); Harry J. Maue, 1994:  A Bad Year for Legal Ethics, 5 CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 1, 
1995, at 1.  See, e.g., Darlene Ricker, supra note 37;  See also Karen Dillon, Katten Partner Resigns 
after Alleged Overbilling, 17 AM. L., Apr. 1995, at 13 (“It’s a pathetic scenario that is becoming all 
too common: a well-respected senior lawyer at a top firm watching his career unravel amid 
allegations of what amounts to petty theft.  The latest example is Glenn Nadell, the former head of 
tax at Chicago’s Katten Muchin & Zavis, who quietly resigned in February after an internal audit 
discovered allegedly ‘questionable’ billing of expenses to a client, according to name partner Allan 
Muchin.  In all, Muchin says, the 42-year-old Nadell allegedly overbilled clients for a total of less 
than $50,000 in phony or inflated expenses over a three-year period.”). 
 135. Catherine Rampell, South Koreans Put In Most Hours, N.Y. TIMES, ECONOMIX (May 12, 
2010, 12:42 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/s-koreans-put-in-most-hours/ 
(referring to the Report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, for 2008).  
 136. Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to Greed to Dishonesty:  Lawyers, 
Money, and Professional Integrity, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 879, 890-900 (2002). 
 137. David Margolick, A Theft Scandal Ravages a Career At a Leading American Law Firm, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1994, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/13/us/a-theft-scandal-
ravages-a-career-at-a-leading-american-law-firm.html?pagewanted=all. 
 138. Erin White, More Law Firms Are Auditing Themselves to Catch Billing Errors, WALL ST. 
J., July 14, 1998, at B8. 
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Among other things, the firm discovered that the lawyer had hired 
his wife (a partner at Chapman & Cutler, another prestigious law firm) 
to collect on a bill on behalf of his law firm.  His wife charged her 
husband’s law firm $250,000 to collect on that bill, even though his wife 
never collected the money owed.  As managing partner, he approved his 
wife’s bill.139 
The firm dug deeper and discovered “systematic, worsening abuses 
over a six-year period,” totaling an additional $500,000.140  He took 
money that was not his, was not caught, and started taking more—like 
the person who makes one rolling stop, and then another, and then it 
becomes his habit.  Eventually, the court sentenced him to two years in 
prison for mail fraud and tax evasion.  His wife, who was a lawyer at 
Chapman & Cutler, had her own problems as well.  Among other things, 
the firm discovered that she had billed many hours when she was on 
vacation with her boyfriend and not working at all.  The court sentenced 
her to a year and a day in prison.141 
When lawyers engage in sharp practices they create a culture 
prejudicial to ethical behavior.  The young associates will learn from that 
culture.  The junior associates are more likely to take their cues from the 
senior associates who become partners rather than the senior associates 
who do not.  And, if the associates being promoted are the ones padding 
their bills, the junior associates will know what to do. 
Disgruntled clients are increasingly auditing law firm bills142 and 
what they find is not pretty.  We do not know how serious this problem 
is, but one survey of lawyers found that 23% of them said that they had 
billed two clients for the same hour of work; 66% said they knew of 
specific instances of bill padding.143  Clients are becoming more 
concerned, and are now more likely to challenge their bills by turning to 
legal auditors.  That, in turn, has led to the creation and rapid growth of 
companies that specialize in auditing legal bills. 
 
 139. Margolick, supra note 137. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Lerman, supra note 136, at 897 & n.146. 
 142. E.g., Claire Hamner Matturro, Auditing Attorneys’ Bills:  Legal and Ethical Pitfalls of a 
Growing Trend, 73 FL. B. J. 14 (May 1999), https://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/ 
jnjournal01.nsf/Subjects/554C2B2514BE522985256ADB005D6261. 
 143. David Segal, In the Business of Billing?, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at H1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/longterm/ethics/ethics2.htm; See also Michael D. 
Goldhaber, New Study Shows Fraudulent Billing Not an Isolated Matter, N.Y. L. J., Oct. 12, 1999, 
at 1 (1999); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Commodification of Insurance Defense Practice, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 2053, 2070-92 (2006) (bill auditing and litigation guidelines). 
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Legal auditing is a growth industry.144  One former litigator started 
a legal audit service using as the corporate headquarters his maid’s room 
in his New York City apartment.  A decade later, his company occupied 
a 20,000 square-foot office, employed 130 people, and audited $60,000 
in legal bills on a typical business day.145 
In one case, legal auditors found, the law firm charged the 
corporate client $24,053 for drafting injunction papers that the firm 
never filed.  The law firm charged $177,251 when the people whom the 
law firm used to staff the case met to update each other on how the case 
was going.146  Another legal audit uncovered that one firm charged 
$37,000 for air travel and restaurant expenses and did not have a single 
receipt.  For three months, one firm had billed twelve hours a day for a 
lawyer hospitalized in a coma from a car accident.147 
If a lawyer says that he spent two hours reading a court decision 
and found out that it was not helpful, it is difficult for the client to prove 
that the lawyer is a liar.  But if the lawyer is in a coma, it is much easier 
for the disgruntled client to prove bill padding.  It also calls into question 
all the other hours that the lawyers billed. 
One case that led to discipline involved Michael Romansky, a 
senior partner of a major, national law firm, McDermott, Will & Emery.  
Mr. Romansky reviewed a bill prepared for a client, Dr. Siepser, and 
decided to add three hours to the 2.5 hours that the associate had 
billed.148  The firm, like many major law firms, typically bill by the 
hour.149  The firm had told Dr. Siepser that it would bill based on the 
number of hours that lawyers worked on the matter, “but Romansky 
added the hours anyway.”150  He also decided that the firm should not 
send Dr. Siepser any details on “how the bill was calculated or how 
much time had been recorded.”151  By mistake, the firm sent the time 
 
 144. One such firm calls itself:  The Devil’s Advocate:  Legal Fee Management & Litigation 
Consulting.  Its webpage is at:  http://www.devilsadvocate.com/Default.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 
2010).  It advises:  “Our clients include major corporations, government agencies, law firms, 
insurance companies, and anyone else who pays substantial legal fees, needs to examine the 
reasonableness of legal fees, or wishes to analyze litigation.”  Id. 
 145. Milo Geyelin, Crossing the Bar: If You Think Insurers are Tight, Try Being One of Their 
Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1999, at A1, col. 1 & A8, col. 1. See also ROTUNDA & 
DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 8, at §§ 1.5-(1)(c), 1.5-5(a), (b). 
 146. Segal, supra note 143. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Lerman, supra note 17, at 849. 
 149. Ronald D. Rotunda, Moving from Billable Hours to Fixed-Fees:  Task-Based Fees and 
Legal Ethics, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 819 (1999). 
 150. Lerman, supra note 17, at 849. 
 151. Id. at 850. 
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records to the client, which led to the discovery.  Further investigation 
led to other problems involving other clients.152  The court ended up 
suspending Mr. Romansky for thirty days, although the Bar Counsel had 
recommended a six-month suspension.153  One judge, dissenting to the 
light discipline, viewed the case differently.  She agreed with  Bar 
Counsel, who had recommended a six-month sanction, because Mr. 
Romansky had not only added hours not worked to the bills of various 
clients, but had  
“engaged in deceptive and dishonest actions relating to his practice of 
law, in one instance formulating and submitting a forged letter to assist 
respondent in the internal investigation of his billing practices, and in 
the other assigning an associate to work on a matter for his father and 
then instructing her to bill the time to another client’s account.”154   
 
He had developed a habit of deceit. 
A lawyer at another firm said he billed clients, on average, nearly 
1200 hours per month in 1990 and 1991.  His low month for billable 
hours was 851 hours and his high month was 1547 hours.  He not only 
apparently worked very hard but he also defied the iron laws of 
mathematics and of time:  in a month of thirty-one days there are only 
744 hours, but he billed 1547 hours.155 
A Chapman & Cutler partner claimed that he billed 6022 hours in 
one year, 1993.156  And, he had billed over 5000 billable hours for 
several years prior to that.157  The lawyer claimed that he worked on 
bankruptcy matters for fifty-two all-nighters in a row!  There was no 
evidence that any clients complained, and the law firm and the 
individual lawyer who charged these astronomical hours defended the 
billings.158 But lawyers from other law firms were incredulous.159 
 
 152. Id. at 850-54. 
 153. In re Romansky, 938 A.2d 733, 743 (D.C. 2007).  The Disciplinary Board agreed with the 
Hearing Committee that Mr. Romansky had “deliberately increased the hours billed in order to 
charge a premium that he was not entitled to,” but the court concluded that his actions amounted to 
negligent conduct, not reckless conduct.  Id. at 737, 739. 
 154. Id. at 744 (Kramer, J., writing separately with respect to Section VI) (internal parentheses 
excluded without indication, identifying two other matters). 
 155. Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys:  Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing 
Battle Over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205, 211 (1997). 
 156. Lerman, supra note 136, at 892, 905-06, 918. 
 157. Douglas R. Richmond, The New Law Firm Economy, Billable Hours, and Professional 
Responsibility, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 209 n.14 (2000); Lerman, supra note 136, at 892 n.93. 
 158. Eleanor Kerlow, Turbulence Of 1994 Puts Law Firm Management On View, 14 No. 1 Of 
Counsel 1, *8 (Jan. 2, 1995); Charles Silver, Flat Fees And Staff Attorneys:  Unnecessary 
Casualties in the Continuing Battle over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 205, 211 (1997-1998). 
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In a typical day, it takes a lawyer more than eight hours of time to 
work eight billable hours.  For example, the lawyer cannot charge for 
time spent on law firm committee work or similar administrative 
matters.  The partner cannot bill a client for the time he discusses with 
his partners what should be that year’s bonus for a given associate.  This 
partner will spend time on continuing legal education, a bar meeting, or 
client development.  That is not billable either.  When the lawyer is 
eating lunch, taking a coffee break, chatting with a colleague about last 
night’s baseball game, or using the restroom, that is not work that he can 
bill to any client. 
A billable hour is time spent working on a legal matter for the 
benefit of the client.  The lawyer who seriously claimed to bill clients for 
6022 hours in one year must bill, on average, over 16.5 hours each and 
every day of 356 days a year.  There are only 8760 hours in an entire 
year.  That lawyer is claiming to work more than sixteen hours every 
weekday and also every Sunday and every Saturday.  He must be in the 
office working on client matters on Christmas Day, July 4th, December 
31st, and January 1st.  If he takes even one day off, he has to bill over 
sixteen hours on some other days, but on each of those other days he was 
already working over sixteen hours.  On average, he has to spend less 
than eight hours a day to sleep—apparently sleep was not necessary for 
this lawyer who claimed to have worked all night for fifty-two days (and 
nights) in a row.  Out of the 7.5 hours left in each day, he must not only 
sleep but also eat, commute to work, read a newspaper, shower and 
shave, dress himself, take a shower, pay his bills, etc.  If he were a 
prisoner of war instead of a highly paid law partner, the Geneva 
Convention would forbid him from going fifty-two days without sleep. 
When a lawyer claims to work that many hours, one would think 
that his partners know that something is amiss.  However, perhaps his 
colleagues did not mind the increased income that the law firm earned.  
The lawyers who overbill may be moving up in the firm pecking order at 
an above-average rate.  The more senior lawyers may close their eyes to 
what they do not want to see.  Other lawyers, particularly the junior 
associates, may conclude that they should exaggerate their hours if they 
also wish to climb up the partnership ladder.160  They may well 
 
 159. E.g., Segal, supra note 143; Richmond, supra note 157, at 209 n.14. 
 160. See, e.g., Richmond, supra note 95, at 202-03 (discussing an instance where a law firm 
linked associate compensation to billable hours).  Several associates complained that another 
associate was padding his hours.  That associate “admitted inflating his time,” but the law firm did 
nothing.  Id.  Later, the supervising partner championed the promotion of the hour-padding associate 
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rationalize what they are doing:  “everyone does it;” “I shouldn’t reduce 
my billable hours for the thirty-minute chat with a friend, because I was 
still thinking about the client;” “I only read this newspaper briefly, and I 
really did that to see if there is anything that might inspire me about the 
client, so I’ll charge him for my newspaper break.” 
There is an old joke about the client who questioned the lawyer 
about part of his bill.  “What is this $100 charge for?” asked the client.  
The lawyer replied:  “That’s when I was walking downtown.  I saw you 
on the other side of the street, crossed over to say hello, and found out 
that it wasn’t you.”161  Clients may not enjoy this vignette as heartily as 
lawyers. 
It is unlikely that the lawyer who overbills starts off by billing 1800 
hours in a year and then jumped up to 6000 the next year.  More likely, 
as Aristotle suggested, the lawyer will add a little extra time to his bill, 
and the lawyer will notice that no one challenges him.  Next time, he 
adds a few more hours.  He justified his actions.  Perhaps he was tired, 
and so does not subtract the time he was taking a little nap, because he 
was still thinking about the problem, even if only subconsciously.  Or, 
he adds a little this time because he recalls that he may not have earlier 
counted hours that he should have.  He is only making up the difference.  
Later, he does not subtract the time he spent during his coffee break; it 
was just a short break and it helped him think.  Eventually, he adds more 
time.  Ultimately, he may be caught, or maybe not. 
We do not wake up one morning and decide to become crooks; we 
decide to rationalize, and in so doing, we develop a habit of padding 
hours.  Over time, the habit becomes more habit-forming, and we pad a 
bit more.  The habit is not limited to keeping track of our hours.  It can 
permeate everything.  If we are involved in discovery and the other side 
is not cooperative, we may decide to become uncooperative, although 
the proper remedy is to go to the judge, not to engage in self-help.  And 
if the judge does not want to get involved, if like Kitty Genovese’s 
neighbors he closes the window and averts his eyes, he also helps to 
support our self-help habit, because we know that the judge is not 
helping us.  Instead of arguing that a document is protected as work-
product, it is simpler not to produce it and leave it off of any list of 
disputed documents. 
 
to full partnership.  Id.  What kind of culture is that law firm creating?  The question, of course, is 
rhetorical. 
 161. The URL for lawyers’ jokes on my home page is as follows:  http://www1.chapman.edu/ 
~rrotunda/lawyer.htm  (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).  See also MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR:  
LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE (2005) (analyzing and discussing hundreds of lawyer jokes). 
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Ethical law firms want to build ethical habits.  They do not want 
their lawyers billing phantom hours.  One structural change that these 
law firms can institute is to have its bills (or, at least, its larger bills) 
subject to routine audit.  Indeed, that is what some firms are doing.162  
The auditors work for the law firm, not the client, so they can report the 
problem and give the firm an opportunity to correct it. 
A law firm that institutes this change sends a message to every 
partner and associate: it is better for the law firm to catch the error 
(whether or not intentional)163 than for the law firm to react to a client’s 
complaint.  And it is better for the lawyer not to pad his hours because it 
will not look good if the law firm’s auditors discover the padding. 
Right now, if a partner bills an unusually large number of hours, 
e.g., over 5000 hours in a single year,164 there is an economic incentive 
of partners in large firms to avert their eyes because the firm benefits 
from the large number of billable hours, as long as the client does not 
complain.165  The greater the number of hours that any lawyer bills, the 
greater the profits per partner—unless the partner is caught.  If the 
 
 162. Annette S. Biesecker, The Legal Audit:  A How To Manual for Internal Auditors, 
ACCOUNTINGWEB, May 2, 2000, http://www.accountingweb.com/item/16236; White, supra note 
138. 
 163. For example, the auditor that one law firm employed discovered that it almost charged 
one client $8,000 for a hotel its lawyers did not use.  White, supra note 138. 
  In other cases, the excessive billing hardly appears inadvertent.  Audits have discovered 
that lawyers have charged clients for (1) flying personal aircraft to destinations rather than using 
commercial airlines; (2) purchasing a cell phone; and (4) buying clothes, on the theory—said the 
particular lawyer—that he needed his clothes laundered and he could not find laundry facilities in a 
city the size of Cleveland, so he bought new clothes.  Adam C. Altman, To Bill, or Not To Bill?:  
Lawyers Who Wear Watches Almost Always Do, Although Ethical Lawyers Actually Think About It 
First, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 216-17 (1998). 
 164. Richmond, supra note 157, at 209 n.14 (referring to this case and finding the number of 
hours claimed as simply “ridiculous[]”). 
 165. Douglas Richmond counsels law firms on how to avoid trouble by false billing. Some 
partners do not like the associates to hear this advice.  He relates the following: 
I was asked to speak to the associates at a regional office of a major Midwestern law 
firm about billing practices.  I was invited to speak by a partner and a staff member who 
were organizing an associate-training program.  When the firm’s managing attorney (a 
partner in his fifties) learned of my intended presentation, he angrily canceled it.  Why? 
He apparently felt threatened when he learned that I planned to tell the associates that 
they should record their telephone time accurately: to use the timing feature on their 
telephones when possible and to remind them that most telephone calls probably should 
be billed at one-tenth (0.1) of an hour. 
Id. at 209 n.19.  Why does a five-minute phone call take thirty minutes?  Because, the partner 
claimed that every telephone call is a “distraction” and it takes at least a half-hour to overcome this 
distraction.  Id.  Hence, the person who called must pay top dollar for the lawyer’s “inability to 
switch intellectual gears.”  Id. 
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partner who has final approval of the bills is the one who engaged in 
padding the bills, we should not be surprised that the billing partner 
thinks her bills are fine. 
In contrast, in-house auditors who do not partake in profit-sharing 
(they would be paid by year or by the project), have no incentive to roll-
over and ignore bill padding.  Instead, like other auditors, they would 
question the unusual, eyebrow-raising bills.  If the auditors receive no 
adequate justification, the leadership of the law should be less likely to 
approve the billing.  Without this structural change, the partner who 
approves his or her own bills knows that his value in the law firm 
increases because (short of a disgruntled client filing a lawsuit) the high-
billing partner is a firm asset instead of a firm liability. 
X.  CREATING AN ETHICAL CULTURE THROUGH ETHICS EDUCATION 
The examples we have been discussing concern outright fraud.  In 
many other instances lawyers pad their hours in a way that is more 
difficult to uncover.  The lawyer does not claim to work more hours in a 
week than there are in a week.  Instead, the lawyer may engage in 
double-billing, i.e., billing two clients each for work performed at the 
same time that was beneficial to both clients.  Or, the lawyer may bill the 
client for a recycled legal memorandum.  “Recycling” occurs when the 
lawyer bills the client by the hour for the work (e.g., research or 
drafting) that the lawyer had already performed at another time for a 
different client.  For example, the lawyer writes a legal memorandum for 
Client #1, a project that takes twenty-five hours of work.  A few months 
later, a second client asks a similar question, and the lawyer spends three 
hours updating the memorandum but charges twenty-eight hours (the 
initial twenty-five hours plus three hours to update) to Client #2.  In all 
situations, the lawyer has told the client that the law firm bills by the 
hour, not by the project. 
Lawyers have told me that they are worried that some associates 
may be padding their hours by double-billing or by billing for recycled 
work product.  And, they ask me, why do we teach that in law school?  
We do not teach them that.  The students figure that out all by 
themselves, or they learn it at the law firm.  They learn by seeing what 
the older lawyers do, and they take note of which lawyers become 
partners. 
In 1994, the ABA Ethics Committee published a Formal Opinion 
that made it very clear that lawyers who inform the client that they are 
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billing the client based on hours worked may not pad those hours 
because the lawyers think the results obtained justify premium billing.166  
Similarly, lawyers who spend ten hours writing a memorandum of law 
and then distribute it to three different clients may not charge each client 
for the ten hours, thereby totaling thirty hours of billable hours when 
they are only performing ten hours of work.  A lawyer who sits in a 
plane for five hours traveling to a hearing for Client #1, while using 
those five hours to read documents for Client #2, may not charge Client 
#1 for five hours of travel time while simultaneously charging Client #2 
for five hours of reading documents.167 
Education in legal ethics does not turn an unethical lawyer into an 
ethical one.  If you want to steal, you can do that even if you know the 
Rules of Professional Conduct by heart.  Just as the Devil can quote 
scripture, the unethical lawyer can quote the ABA Model Rules.  
However, learning the law of ethics can give us scienter.  By that I mean 
that the educated lawyer will not do something wrong—create a conflict 
of interest, violate a client confidence, etc.—by mistake.  And that, at 
least, is some progress. 
Legal education offers some hope with respect to bill padding.  In 
1991, before the ABA Formal Opinion in 1993, a survey of lawyers 
showed that about 50% said that they never engaged in double-billing, 
but 50% could not say that.168  By 1994-1995, the survey showed that 
about 75% of the lawyers said that they never double-billed.169   
Similar surveys showed that the number of lawyers who shunned 
recycling also increased.  In 1991, only 12.4% of respondent-lawyers 
said that it was never ethical for a lawyer to bill a client for work that the 
lawyer originally undertook for another client but then “recycled” for the 
 
 166. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993). 
 167. This issue has garnered much scholarly commentary.  See, e.g., Sonia S. Chan, ABA 
Formal Opinion 93-379:  Double Billing, Padding and Other Forms of Overbilling, 9 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 611 (1996); WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR:  THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED 
BILLING BY ATTORNEYS (1996); Kevin Hopkins, Law Firms, Technology, and the Double-Billing 
Dilemma, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95 (1998); Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking:  Regulation of 
Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205 (1999); JOHN W. TOOTHMAN 
& WILLIAM G. ROSS, LEGAL FEES: LAW AND MANAGEMENT (2003); Douglas R. Richmond, For A 
Few Dollars More:  The Perplexing Problems of Unethical Billing Practices by Lawyers, 60 S.C. L. 
REV. 63, 65 (2009).  See also People v. Espinoza, 35 P.3d 552, 555 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2001) (lawyer 
disbarred for inflating her billing hours and for other unethical conduct). 
 168. ROSS, supra note 167, at 83. 
 169. Id. 
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second client.  By 1994-1995, that number increased from 12.4% to 
65%.170 
Another survey a few years later, 1999 to 2000, confirms that the 
trend is continuing.  The survey asked lawyers, “During the last year, 
have you ever billed two clients for work performed at the same time 
(e.g., billing one client for reviewing a deposition while billing another 
client for travel time)?”171  This time, 86% said no.172  When the survey 
asked if the lawyer billed more than the revision time when revising and· 
recycling a document originally prepared for another client, 83% of the 
respondents said no.173 
Granted, some may argue that such surveys do not measure what 
lawyers do, only what lawyers say when asked.  Lawyers may not be 
becoming more honest but only more hypocritical.  Perhaps I am too 
Pollyannaish, but even that interpretation gives us hope.  Hypocrisy is 
the tribute that vice pays to virtue.  At a minimum, the surveys show that 
attitudes are moving in the right direction and lawyers now know that 
double-billing is wrong.  If they are ethical, then they now know what to 
stop doing. 
The change in attitude after the ABA Formal Opinion rejecting 
double-billing and recycled work product does not mean that the ABA 
Formal Opinion caused the change.  Logicians refer to an old principle, 
post hoc ergo non propter hoc.  This principle is so old that we refer to it 
in a language long dead.  It means “after this not therefore because of 
this.”  A sequence of events does not prove that the former caused the 
latter.  I can hit a drum when a solar eclipse starts and the eclipse will 
then end, but not because of my drum skills.  Correlation does not prove 
causation. 
Still, the ABA Formal Opinion (as well as the well-publicized 
lawsuits by disgruntled clients objecting to bills) should give incentive 
to law firms to train their associates in order to avoid future problems.  
And, the evidence is consistent with the conclusion that education 
reduces the problem.  In the 1994-1995 survey, nearly 60% of the 
lawyers had never heard of ABA Formal Opinion 93-379.174  By 1999-
2000, the number of lawyers who had never heard of the ABA Opinion 
 
 170. Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale:  An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law 
Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 U. MO.-KAN. CITY L. REV. 239, 
258 (2000-2001). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. ROSS, supra note 167, at 266, Question 17(c) (reporting that 57% had never heard of ABA 
Formal Opinion 93-379). 
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fell to 50%.175  People cannot follow an ethics opinion if they do not 
even know of its existence.  The change in the poll results offers some 
hope that law firms are making an effort to teach the younger lawyers 
what they most assuredly learned in their law school course in Legal 
Ethics but what they most assuredly must have forgotten.176 
When a law firm gives in-house ethics training in the principles 
governing double-billing, it will be creating a positive ethical culture.  It 
will also be sending a message to its lawyers that it cares about ethics.  
In-house ethics training will not prevent fraudulent lawyers from 
padding their hours, but it will prevent lawyers from violating ethics 
rules because of ignorance. 
Lawyers have an economic incentive to pursue Continuing Legal 
Education (CLE) in areas where they practice.  For example, lawyers 
who practice in the area of securities understand that they need to keep 
up on the latest cases and regulations under the Sarbanes-Oxley statute.  
But lawyers do not have the same economic incentive to keep up with 
the latest case law on lawyer disqualification, or the latest ethics 
opinions on double billing.  Every lawyer practices in the area of legal 
ethics but often does not know that.  Hence, there is a greater need for 
CLE in the area of legal ethics, which is a subject area that is more apt to 
be forgotten.  It is not enough for the general counsel to the law firm to 
keep up with the latest law; he or she must communicate the important 
cases and ethics opinions to the other lawyers in the law firm so they 
will know what to do. 
Or, we can decide to shut the window like Kitty Genovese’s 
neighbors, not get involved, and avert our gaze. 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
Lawyers are more than ever interested in their ethical obligations.  
They should be, because malpractice law suits and government 
enforcement actions—both based on the Rules of Professional 
Conduct—are on the increase. 
Our ethics rules make lawyers different than other professionals, 
and the popular culture does not always understand us.  When a medical 
doctor treats a patient, there is no doctor on the other side representing 
the disease.  Not so for lawyers.  In most cases where lawyers are 
 
 175. Fortney, supra note 170, at 259. 
 176. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY:  PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 114 (10th ed. 2008). 
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involved, each side has a lawyer, and each client does not appreciate the 
lawyer on his side defending the adversary. 
The popular culture often criticizes lawyers for being too tough, for 
acting like a James Cagney character when Cagney played the villain 
(Tom Powers in The Public Enemy177), not the song and dance man 
(George M. Cohan in Yankee Doodle Dandy178).  Yet, the same people 
critical of “Rambo litigators” freely admit that, when they have a 
problem, they want the lawyer who plays hardball.179  Let the other side 
choose a cream puff to represent him.  Society places a dual role on 
lawyers—the general populace expects lawyers to be tough (and they 
fault us if we act like door-mats), but the general populace also wants us 
to be gentle and kind (and we are faulted if we act like Cagney-doubles).  
Psychologists predict that these self-contradictory expectations lead 
lawyers to be depressed, because people internalize qualities that others 
project on them.  As one New York Gestalt psychologist explains:  
“Nobody ever says they want a nice lawyer.  They say, ‘I want a 
barracuda.  I want a real throat-slitter.’  So lawyers have these qualities 
dumped on them.”180 
We should not be surprised that lawyers are often depressed 
because they are taking on society’s distaste for what they do.  Lawyers 
in general—and trial lawyers in particular—lead tense lives.  It is no 
accident that, when the Association of Trial Lawyers of America offered 
a two-hour crash course on stress management, it drew a healthy 
crowd.181  There are, sadly, increasing number of reports about lawyers 
committing suicide.182 
 
 177. THE PUBLIC ENEMY (Warner Bros. Pictures 1931). 
 178. YANKEE DOODLE DANDY (Warner Bros. Pictures 1942). 
 179. William A. Brewer III & John W. Bickel II, Etiquette of the Advocate? Courtesy Codes 
Serve No Useful Purpose And, Moreover, Are Potentially Counterproductive, TEX. LAW., Mar. 21, 
1994, at 20, 21; James Podgers, Public:  “Shyster” OK—If He’s on Your Side, 67 A.B.A. J. 695 
(June 1981). 
 180. Amy Stevens, Why Lawyers Are Depressed, Anxious, Bored Insomniacs, WALL ST. J., 
June 12, 1995, at B1, col. 3 & B7, col. 5. 
 181. The course was offered at ATLA’s July, 1995 annual meeting.  See Richard B. Schmitt, 
Trial Lawyers, Under Fire, Take Case to the Politicians, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1995, at B2, col. 1. 
 182. E.g., Brian Baxter, Reed Smith Partner’s Death Deemed a Suicide, THE AMLAW DAILY, 
July 21, 2010, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/07/reed-smith-suicide.html 
(reporting the suicide of a fifty-seven-year-old partner); Steven Harper, Silent Grief, THE AMLAW 
DAILY, July 21, 2010, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/07/ 
harperdeadlyserious.html (reporting other suicides); Ashby Jones, On Suicide Within Big Firms: 
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One need not rely on such anecdotal evidence, for more scientific 
studies come to the same conclusion.  Surveys of lawyers typically show 
that severe depression is more likely to occur among lawyers than 
among other occupations.183  Another study showed high elevations of 
the testosterone hormone in prisoners, cold-call salespeople, the 
unemployed, and—no surprise here—lawyers.184  Ministers, priests, and 
farmers, by the way, were at the low end of the scale.185  A recent survey 
showed that mid-level associates at big law firm are unhappy; they are 
earning six-figure salaries at a time when many lawyers are looking for 
work.  Yet they are unhappy, with the lowest level of satisfaction since 
2004.186 
There is no simple magic bullet that will make lawyers feel better 
about what they do, or make society appreciate what lawyers do.  
However, there are a few things that law firms, particularly large law 
firms, can do to make lawyers feel less anonymous and more ethical.  
Firms should create, and the law should encourage, structural incentives 
to reduce anonymity and promote ethical habits.  Firms should appoint 
in-house general counsel, in whom lawyers could easily and 
confidentially confide if they have ethical questions about their own 
conduct or the conduct of others.  Firms should set up procedures for 
routine in-house auditing of legal bills to catch fraudulent or inadvertent 
padding of hours before the client raises questions.  Firms should 
provide for in-house ethics training to prevent lawyers from violating 
ethics rules because of ignorance.  Court decisions should not make it 
more difficult for law firms to create structural incentives that encourage 
lawyers to get into the habit of following the rules that already exist.  
Thus, the attorney client privilege should protect lawyers who consult 
with other lawyers about their ethical obligations for the same reason 
that the privilege protects clients when consulting with their lawyers: 
confidentiality promotes candid advice. 
 
 183. Stevens, supra note 180, at B1. 
 184. Anita Sharpe, Spit Testing May Be Hard to Swallow In the Workplace, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
29, 1993, at A1, A5, col.4.  The survey measured the testosterone level in spit because that is a non-
evasive way of testing. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Associates Survey 2010:  National Rankings, AM. LAW., Sept. 1, 2010, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202470242761&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial 
&bu=The%20American%20Lawyer&pt=Am%20Law%20Daily&cn=Am_Law_Daily_09012010&
kw=THE%20CHARTS%3A%20National%20Rankings.  The 2010 Survey showed that “associates’ 
satisfaction has dropped to the lowest level in six years.” http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/ 
PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202470848460&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 . See also, Drew Combs, 
Associates Survey 2010:  The Lucky Ones?, AM. LAW., Sept. 1, 2010 (“Midlevel associates' overall 
satisfaction level is down to the lowest level in six years.”). 
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